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THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN  
THEATER OF OPERATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II

(2)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by

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B.A., Western Maryland College, Westminster, Maryland, 1979

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING WORLD WAR II by MAJ William B. Dallas, USA, 113 pages.

This study is an historical analysis of US Army counterintelligence in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II. The study reviews the organization, doctrine, missions, and equipment of counterintelligence units to determine their impact on operations in the ETO, Germany. This study also reviews the same topics for counterintelligence operations prior to World War II to determine significant changes that may have affected operations in World War II.

The study concludes that the decision to place counterintelligence assets with combat units from the division to theater level was the most significant decision of the war for US Army counterintelligence. The lack of a coherent doctrine, organization, and training program significantly reduced the ability of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) to contribute to the war effort in the ETO prior to 1943. As the result of wartime experience and doctrine developed in 1943, the CIC became proactive, making significant contributions to counter the German Intelligence Service at both the operational and tactical levels. Based on these lesson learned, the study makes recommendations for the future of counterintelligence in the US Army as the 21st century approaches.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ATS</b>	<b>Advanced Training School</b>
<b>APL</b>	<b>American Protective League</b>
<b>CONUS</b>	<b>Continental United States</b>
<b>CIP</b>	<b>Corps of Intelligence Police</b>
<b>CE</b>	<b>Counterespionage</b>
<b>CCL</b>	<b>Counterintelligence Control Line</b>
<b>CIC</b>	<b>Counter Intelligence Corps</b>
<b>EPW</b>	<b>Enemy Prisoner of War</b>
<b>ETO</b>	<b>European Theater of Operation</b>
<b>FBI</b>	<b>Federal Bureau of Investigation</b>
<b>FM</b>	<b>Field Manual</b>
<b>GIS</b>	<b>German Intelligence Service</b>
<b>ID</b>	<b>Infantry Division</b>
<b>IPW</b>	<b>Interrogation of Prisoner of War</b>
<b>LT</b>	<b>Lieutenant</b>
<b>MG</b>	<b>Military Government</b>
<b>MI</b>	<b>Military Intelligence</b>
<b>MID</b>	<b>Military Intelligence Division</b>
<b>ONI</b>	<b>Office of Naval Intelligence</b>
<b>OSS</b>	<b>Office of Strategic Services</b>
<b>OCS</b>	<b>Office Candidate School</b>

SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TM	Technical Manual
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Overview

Benedict Arnold, Juluis and Ethel Rosenberg, Franz von Rintel, Roderick J. Ramsey, James Hall III, and Clyde L. Conrad were all traitors to their country--spies or saboteurs for a foreign power. These individuals achieved a high degree of success in their endeavors, and each caused significant damage to the US military and federal government by their actions. The field of counterintelligence was established to detect and neutralize traitors, spies, saboteurs and subversives like the people mentioned above. Counterintelligence in the Army has developed informally since the Revolutionary War and formally since World War I.<sup>1</sup> Counterintelligence has changed in size and importance since its formal activation on 13 August 1917 but not because of the threat of espionage, sabotage, or subversion directed against the US Army.<sup>2</sup> This change, for the most part, occurred with the changes in the size and importance of the Army.

As the US Army reduces in size and capabilities in the 1990s, what will the effects of the reduction be on US

Army counterintelligence? What will this mean in terms of the ability to protect the strategic interest of the nation, and protect the operational and tactical forces? These answers are unknown. It is hoped that by exploring the historical contributions of counterintelligence during the last world war, this thesis may help to show the significance of this particular field of intelligence during both peace and war.

#### Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to study the counterintelligence efforts of the US Army during World War II (WW II). The organization, doctrine, missions, and equipment of counterintelligence units will be studied to determine their impact on operations in the European Theater of Operations (ETO,. Applicable lessons will be drawn that apply to present and future counterintelligence operations. These lessons may require further study to determine the exact operational impact on the future of US Army Counterintelligence.

#### Research Question

The research question is: How were US Army Counterintelligence units organized, trained, and equipped to support operations in the ETO during WW II?

This question has generated several secondary research questions that must be answered to properly examine the primary question. These questions are:

- a. What counterintelligence assets existed at the operational and tactical levels in the US Army three years prior to America entering WW II?
- b. What significant changes in organization, structure, doctrine and mission occurred in the counterintelligence field from 1938 to 1945 at the operational and tactical levels?
- c. How did counterintelligence units operate, function, and support US Army commanders during WW II in the ETO?
- d. Was counterintelligence unit activity proactive or reactive in the ETO?
- e. How effective were US Army counterintelligence units in countering German intelligence operations in the ETO?

#### Methodology

This section provides an overview of the methods and procedures used to study the research question. The major steps in the methodology were: literature search and examination of selected World War II counterintelligence operations reports and summaries; a comparison of pre-WW II and WW II counterintelligence; and an evaluation of the

historical experience with modern day implications. Primary sources were used for this thesis where possible. Examples of these sources are the initial reports, orders, directives and original summary reports of counterintelligence activity. Secondary sources consisted of historical reports and books, US Army General Board reviews, and lessons learned reports.

#### Scope

The scope of the study included assumptions, definitions, limitations and delimitations. Assumptions were statements which were not supported by factual information, but were necessary for the thesis to proceed. Limitations were constraints on the thesis which were beyond the author's ability to control. Delimitations were limits placed on the thesis by the author to focus the study and allow an in-depth examination of the subject. Without narrowing the focus of the study, only a hollow, and hence valueless product could have been produced.

#### Assumptions

The assumptions included those on applicability, research, and methodology. The following were underlying assumptions of the thesis:

- a. That the experience and lessons learned from US Army counterintelligence operations and German

intelligence operations during World War II were relevant for historical study.

b. That lessons from US Army counterintelligence operations during World War II provided useful knowledge and insight to the future employment of US Army counterintelligence assets.

c. That post WW II studies and lessons learned prepared by American and German personnel were grounded in fact, and not biased by philosophical or political views.

d. That periodic counterintelligence reports of units in the ETO contained accurate summaries regarding the actual execution of counterintelligence operations.

#### Definitions

The following definitions are necessary to ensure a common understanding of terms used in this thesis:

Agents. Enlisted personnel who possess characteristics, training and experience which make them potential special agents.<sup>3</sup>

Counterespionage. "Measures taken to prevent or confuse enemy espionage."<sup>4</sup>

Counterintelligence (Field Manual 34-80, 1986).

To detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage and international terrorism conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of the US Army.

Counterintelligence (Technical Manual 20-205, 1944).

"Measures intended to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence work."<sup>6</sup>

Espionage. "Use of spies to gain information of military value about the enemy."<sup>7</sup>

Fifth Column. A group of individuals that are secretly sympathetic with the enemy and commit acts of subversion and treason against their own government.<sup>8</sup>

Negative Intelligence. A term used in the early 1900s to describe friendly efforts to prevent the enemy or unfriendly governments from acquiring information or influencing members of the US Government by use of undercover operatives. This includes espionage, sabotage and subversion against the US Government by foreign or domestic sources. Negative intelligence can be equated to the present day definition of counterintelligence.

Positive Intelligence. Information collected on the enemy or potential enemy that is analyzed to produce intelligence on the enemy's mission, capabilities and intentions.

Sabotage. "Destruction of, or injury to, property by enemy agents or sympathizers in an effort to stop or slow down a nation's war effort."<sup>9</sup>

Special Agents. Enlisted personnel possessing investigative, linguistic, legal and technical skills.

These individuals must also have proven loyalty,  
intelligence and resourcefulness.<sup>10</sup>

Subversion.

Pertains to and includes the surreptitious activity of the enemy and of our own military personnel who seek to interfere with our [US Army] interests through mediums other than espionage and sabotage such as, propagandizing, rumor mongering, incitement to riot or resistance, intentional violations of security laws or regulations and organization of groups opposed to the aims of MG [Military Government].<sup>11</sup>

Limitations

There were certain limitations imposed on this study. All records of German intelligence units and operations were not available for study. Where possible, original reports were used to determine the effect of German intelligence operations on US Army counterintelligence. For the most part, historical studies, interviews, and interrogation reports of German officials provided the bulk of information on German operations.

Secondly, the accuracy of information gathered by counterintelligence units can not be verified. The focus of this thesis is counterintelligence operations inside of Germany. The information collected, sources used, and operations reviewed, for the most part, involved German Nationals. The possibility exists that German Nationals provided false information to US Army counterintelligence

personnel. This thesis assumes that the information gathered is generally reliable.

Thirdly, the training status of counterintelligence agents in the ETO could not be determined. Agents involved in the operations were credited as having a basic level of counterintelligence proficiency and were capable of communicating with foreign nationals.

#### Delimitations

Certain delimitations have been placed on this thesis. The focus is on US Army counterintelligence in Germany during WW II. However, the paper reviews counterintelligence in the years preceding WW II in order to set the stage for the counterintelligence operations in the ETO. The operations of counterintelligence units in theaters other than the European Theater are not addressed unless there was a particularly significant lesson learned that helps clarify operations in Germany. Lessons learned and summary reports from previous experience gained in the ETO, but outside of Germany were used.

A second delimitation placed on this thesis was the use of classified information. Sources used in preparation of this thesis were unclassified. However, classified information was reviewed to focus the research.

### Study Overview

This thesis includes a review of the literature, definition of methodology, descriptions of historical events, conducts interpretive analysis, and presents conclusions. The study has five chapters.

The first two chapters set the stage for the thesis. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and establishes the framework. Chapter 2 establishes the status of US Army counterintelligence prior to WW II with an overview of the structure, organization, doctrine, training and generic operations.

Chapter 3 describes the organization, doctrine, equipment and training of counterintelligence units within the ETO. Significant changes from the pre-war status of counterintelligence units are identified.

Chapter 4 describes the theater counterintelligence structure and tasking chain. This chapter also examines counterintelligence operations from the Army Group to the Division level. The effect of German intelligence operations on US Army counterintelligence operations are addressed in this chapter.

Chapter 5 provides an evaluation of, and offers conclusions on the impact of US Army counterintelligence in the ETO during WW II. This chapter also provides implications for the future of counterintelligence in the US Army.

### Review of the Literature

This thesis concerns two major topics: US Army counterintelligence in the years preceding WW II, and counterintelligence in the ETO during WW II. There are numerous books and reports on US Army counterintelligence from WW II to the present. The following review of the literature is divided into two parts.

#### Material Concerning US Army Counterintelligence in the Years Preceding World War II

The War Department Instructions for the Origination and Maintenance of the Counter-Espionage Services of the Military Units published in 1918 provided an excellent summary of the organization, doctrine, structure, responsibilities, and administration for early counterintelligence.

Field Manuals 30-5, 30-25 and 100-5 published in 1939 and 1940 provided very good references on the doctrinal missions, functions and employment of counterintelligence assets. Counterintelligence was mentioned in several places in the 1940 version of the US Army Operations Manual, Field Manual 100-5. Although called counterinformation, the functions described by the manual fall within the 1944 definition of counterintelligence. The term counterinformation was changed to counterintelligence in the 1944 version of this manual. It is interesting to note that counterintelligence was thought to be so important to be

given several pages in the 1939 and 1944 versions of Field Manual 100-5. However, counterintelligence is not mentioned in the current version of this manual.

The Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in WW II provided a good overview of US Army counterintelligence from its inception to the beginning of World War II.

The books America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-1941 and History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 provided good background material for this thesis. Although these books were not primary sources, they set the stage and provided background information regarding the "why and how" of counterintelligence during the early years.

The memorandum from the Director of Military Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Staff, Subject: Counter-Espionage Manuals sent out in March, 1920 was probably the most revealing and concise history of counterintelligence between the two World Wars. In essence this document stated that the Counter Espionage Service will be discontinued.

Material Concerning US Army  
Counterintelligence During World War II

The War Department Technical Manual 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps, provided a valuable view of the organization, structure, functions, operational policies, and administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps during WW II. When coupled with the Table of Organization and Equipment (Number 30-500), Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments, these two documents provide an excellent overview of the doctrinal Counter Intelligence Corps units during WW II.

The History and Mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in WW II and the 30 volume set, The History of the Counter Intelligence Corps was a useful source of information regarding US Army counterintelligence from its' creation to the end of WW II. Although the 30 volume set is still classified, sanitized versions of some volumes are available at the National Archives in Record Group 365.

The daily, weekly, and monthly counterintelligence activity reports produced by various commands provided a very valuable source of information. These documents provided data on the exact operations and actions carried out by counterintelligence units in the ETO. The Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany published by the 12th Army Group provided an outstanding source for the employment and organization of counterintelligence assets in the ETO.

This document amounts to a counterintelligence campaign plan for the Army Group as it prepared to enter Germany.

The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater Number 12 - Military Intelligence Services and Number 13 - Counter Intelligence Corps, and the Report of The Army Ground Forces Intelligence Conference provided valuable sources on lessons learned and recommend changes to the Counter Intelligence Corps immediately after WW II.

## CHAPTER 2

### PRE-WORLD WAR II

#### Historical Overview

To fully comprehend the role of counterintelligence a brief overview of Army Intelligence is necessary. The intelligence effort in the US Army prior to 1917 had been the responsibility of individual intelligence officers, sections supporting the various commands, and a War Department staff. From 1885 until 1903, the Military Information Division of the War Department had been a subordinate function under the Adjutant General. On 14 February 1903, Congress approved a military reform plan put forth by the Secretary of War. This plan created the War Department General Staff (WDGS), with Military Information being the second of three divisions. An independent intelligence staff agency was created which was responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. Although there were reports from the military attaches located around the world, there was no dedicated office or organization to direct, analyze or disseminate pertinent intelligence information before 1903.<sup>1</sup>

The US Army was studying the need to establish a War College at about the same time. This school was to provide officers with coordinated training regarding the "higher arts of war."<sup>2</sup> Although the US Army War College was formed for professional study, the College soon became as much a staff element, as a school. The College was placed in the Third Division of the WDGS and was often used to develop military plans and estimates. Because of the natural need for intelligence on which to develop plans and base estimates, the Second Division and the War College developed close ties. This close association would spell the end of an independent intelligence organization. In June 1908, the Chief of Staff directed that the Second and Third Divisions be merged. The divisions were replaced by sections of the General Staff. The President of the War College was designated as the Chief of the new Second Section.<sup>3</sup> The General Staff was now composed of two sections and an independent intelligence capability was lost. This capability did not resurface until just prior to World War II (WW II).

The Military Information Division operated as one of two major subordinate elements under the new Second Section. The other major element was the War College. The principal duties of the Military Information Division were diverted to provide planning data to the War College instead of intelligence for the War Department. The Division did

little intelligence collection or production, although the military attaches continued to forward intelligence reports. These reports received little attention due to the priority placed on intelligence by the hierarchy and the fact that there was very limited manpower available. Military Intelligence had all but become extinct because it was buried in the War College and the remaining assets were used to handle numerous staff actions unrelated to intelligence.<sup>4</sup>

Counterespionage, countersubversion and countersabotage were known concepts in the US Army prior to 1917. However, neither the Military Information Division or subordinate intelligence officers had a mission to perform these functions. Even if a mission had been given, resources were not available to execute it. The need for both positive and negative intelligence as determined in the early 1900s, was not identified and tasked as a mission until 1917. World War I (WW I) changed the view and need of intelligence to support the American effort in France. As generally happens, war points out the obvious need that was not visible during peace.

The military attaches became extremely important sources of intelligence with the start of the war in Europe. The attaches were also called upon to perform many other duties beyond intelligence collection. The attache system became involved in passport control, propaganda, interrogation of enemy prisoners and escaped allied soldiers,

espionage and counterespionage.<sup>5</sup> The increased activity of the attaches, particularly in Europe, required increased support at the Military Information Division level to handle the flow of intelligence. The need for more assistance in Europe was also spelled out in a formal request from the Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force in August 1917. The first counterintelligence unit to be organized and deployed overseas as a unit was created due to this request. This organization became known as the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP), and was responsible for counterintelligence operations in both the US and overseas locations.<sup>6</sup>

The Military Information Division grew in size and importance, yet remained subordinate to the War College. Colonel Van Deman, Chief of the Military Information Division, reorganized the Division in early 1918 according to the British Intelligence system. This reorganization was necessary due to the rapid increase of personnel and missions. A joint intelligence effort with the British was envisioned during WW I and the alignment of intelligence functions using the British model was deemed the best method to support this effort.<sup>7</sup> The title of the Division was changed, with the word "intelligence" substituted for "information." The functional areas of intelligence were split between positive and negative intelligence. This constituted the first official counterintelligence staff or functional organization in the US Army. The following was

the structure of the Military Intelligence Division (MID) after its reorganization in 1918:

Military Intelligence (MI) 1 - Administration.

MI 2 - Collection, Collation and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence.

MI 3 - Counter-Espionage in the Military Service.

MI 4 - Counter-Espionage Among Civilian Population.

MI 5 - Military Attaches.

MI 6 - Translation.

MI 7 - Graphic.

MI 8 - Cable and Telegraph.

MI 9 - Field Intelligence.

MI 10 - Censorship.

MI 11 - Passports and Port Control.

MI 12 - Graft and Fraud.<sup>8</sup>

Counterintelligence functions were divided between MI Sections 3, 4, 10, 11 and 12. With the birth of counterintelligence at the US Army level, several manuals were developed to provide guidance and direction to intelligence officers. As officers and enlisted personnel performing intelligence duties were detailed for those purposes, a coherent intelligence organization still was not possible. The primary function of those individuals at the subordinate commands was to provide intelligence and ensure security for their units. This was doctrinally correct, but still left the MID with very limited ability to focus on the

strategic level. With the large number of personnel employed by the MID, the need for decentralization soon became apparent. Branch offices were established in New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Seattle, Pittsburgh and New Orleans. These offices were to conduct counterespionage operations to protect the major logistical hubs in the Continental United States (CONUS).<sup>9</sup> This restructuring of the MID and the establishment of branch offices in the major cities initiated counterintelligence operations at the strategic level.

#### Organization

The authorization for the CIP was contained in Section II of an Act of Congress approved on 18 May 1917.<sup>10</sup> This Act empowered the President to increase the strength of the US Army to meet the national emergency that became known as WW I. The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) had its origins in the CIP which was created on 13 August 1917.<sup>11</sup> This was a temporary organization created to counter espionage directed against the War Department and the American forces deploying to Europe. The CIP was also tied directly to the beginning of the US Army's MID, G2, WDGS. This division under the WDGS was responsible for controlling the activities of the CIP and the newly formed staff branch for negative intelligence.

The CIP had its meager beginnings with 50 sergeants of infantry who were to report to the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force for counterespionage duties.<sup>12</sup> The 50 man contingent arrived in France in November 1917, and a portion of this group immediately began training under the supervision of the British Intelligence Service. The remaining men were assigned to the rear area and to divisional intelligence sections. By January 1918, the Corps had established an office in Paris and had begun to build a information card file of over 50,000 names of suspected enemy agents and informants. The first operational mission was conducted at St. Nazaire where enemy agent activity had been reported.<sup>13</sup> Enemy agents who were apprehended were turned over to the government of France for disposition.<sup>14</sup>

In the CONUS, the CIP was under the direction and control of the Chief, War College Division, WDGS. The CIP was authorized 300 soldiers. Of the 300, 250 were assigned duties within CONUS. Control of the CIP was transferred to the Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division of the General Staff in March 1918.<sup>15</sup>

The CIP expanded to 750 personnel authorizations during WW I due to the increased investigative work load throughout the US Army. However, the Corps only reached a present-for-duty strength of 405 agents when the Armistice of WW I was signed and the demobilization of the Corps

began. World War I had ended before the CIP had matured as an organization and an effective counterintelligence force. The CIP developed trained agents and a moderate informant network. In the short period in which the US Army's first counterintelligence element was involved in a war zone, the CIP had conducted over 3,700 investigations. Three individuals were convicted of espionage, 107 people were interned, and 119 persons were expelled from the war zone as a result of the CIP effort.<sup>16</sup> Although these statistics are not overwhelming, it is very difficult to judge the actual effectiveness of the CIP. The number of spies, subversives and saboteurs prevented from entering the American zone due to the screening effort of civilians and displaced personnel will never be known. In CONUS the CIP conducted thousands of counterintelligence investigations and hundreds of plant security surveys.

With the end of WW I, the counterintelligence problems for America and the US Army were just beginning. Approximately one quarter of the population of the United States were foreign-born or had very close ties to other nations. A significant number of these individuals were from, or had ties with countries that the United States counted among its enemies.<sup>17</sup> The concern over foreign subversion in America was fueled by the open hostility to the war by ethnic sections in the country. There was also evidence of a substantial build up of German agents in the

US. However, at no time before the 1940s were there ever more than 250 CIP agents operating in CONUS.

In early 1920, only 18 CIP agents remained on active duty.<sup>18</sup> An attempt was made to make the CIP a permanent part of the US Army. This was in response to the growing threat o communism that was spreading throughout Europe and America. Referring to this threat, Colonel Van Deman, Chief of MID at the conclusion of WW I, warned that America could be "entering on a period of even greater danger to the civilization of the world than the one through which we have just passed."<sup>19</sup>

Authority was granted by the Adjutant General in February 1920, to assign up to 24 sergeants to the Eastern, Western, and Southern Departments, and to Washington, D.C. These individuals were to conduct confidential investigations in response to the "new threat," and all but six of these individuals were under the direction and control of the department commander. The other six agents were assigned to the Western Department, and reported directly to the Director of Military Intelligence.<sup>20</sup> This authorization did not produce a permanent status for the CIP as hoped. Thus by August 1920, the CIP was very close to extinction. At that time, the current strength of the CIP was six men and a dog, all of whom were eligible for discharge.<sup>21</sup>

Further attempts to make the CIP a permanent organization in the US Army eventually were successful. On 14 December 1920, the Corps was authorized 45 sergeants who were to support the military departments throughout the country and overseas. (Table 1 shows the distribution of CIP personnel at that time.) The order granting the increased strength also established the CIP as a permanent organization in the US Army, but the fight for survival would continue for the next 20 years. The 45 authorizations were reduced to 28 in 1926 and reduced again to 15 authorizations in 1933. The Depression years (1929 to 1939) forced a further reduction of personnel that drastically cut the Corps' strength.<sup>22</sup>

In June 1940, the CIP was authorized to increase the strength of the Corps to 50 sergeants. Congress passed the Selective Service Act on 16 September 1940, which authorized the US Army to expand to 1,640,000 soldiers. By this time the CIP had 42 trained investigators.<sup>23</sup> Those on the staff who were responsible for counterintelligence matters were transferred from the War College to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS in January 1941. An independent intelligence capability had finally reemerged. The G2 was organized into five branches, one of which was responsible for counterintelligence. This branch was responsible for assigning cases, case control, case disposition, CIP requirements throughout the US Army, training, regulations,

and the CIP school. After 23 years, the CIP finally had one designated section to provide control and guidance to the Corps. By May 1941, the CIP had 513 authorizations and had increased in strength by more than 32 times since the beginning of 1940.<sup>24</sup> It must be noted that even after an energetic push to increase the size of the CIP, the Corps was still short 34 percent of the authorized personnel. (Table 2 lists the authorized and on hand strength of the CIP in August 1941.)

The CIP began a rapid expansion of personnel and missions shortly before America's entry into World War II. Many more problems occurred for the CIP due to it's new found importance, size and case load. The initial problems experienced included trying to find and train qualified recruits, and how to develop new doctrine for extended operations around the world. This was quite a challenge considering the fact that the CIP had faced near extinction in the preceding 20 years.

#### Doctrine

When the CIP and MID branch offices were established in 1917, doctrine was not produced or developed to provide guidance for the new organization. The newly formed group of men were given a mission statement and shipped off to France to execute that mission. Counterespionage duties were to be performed for the Commanding General, American

Expeditionary Force. The initial doctrine for the CIP was defined by the training received by these individuals. Essentially the training produced the counterintelligence doctrine, rather than the doctrine dictating the training.

The first War Department document regarding counterintelligence operations was the Principles of Counter Espionage Organization and Control within the Military Departments published in May 1918. A second document, Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within the Military Units, was published in August 1918. These two documents provided the organizational structure, operational principles and missions for counterespionage activities that were the responsibility of all intelligence officers within the various Military Departments.<sup>25</sup> These documents provided a comprehensive source of knowledge regarding how counterespionage operations were to be conducted by US forces. The manuals provided guidance on personnel selection and training (both intelligence officers and operatives), collection and handling of information, intelligence reporting, and liaison with civilian agencies. These manuals constituted the doctrinal and technical reference library for the negative intelligence officers.<sup>26</sup> They also provided a doctrinal guide to the CIP and MID branch offices established in CONUS.

These manuals established a counterespionage system within the US Army, but did not create a separate branch of the service.<sup>27</sup> This system essentially divided responsibility for counterintelligence between the work of intelligence officers in the various military departments and the MID, War College, WDGS. The focus of the unit-level work was to protect their respective command from espionage of foreign powers and subversion of their troops.

Knowledge of the existence of negative intelligence, the counterespionage system, operations, and agents was to be kept strictly confidential. The Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within the Military Units stated that knowledge must be restricted to only the "Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer and Assistant Intelligence Officer".<sup>28</sup> This veil of strict security was maintained until the early 1940s. Although secrecy was a trademark of the field, quite often lack of knowledge on the part of the general army population inhibited operations.<sup>29</sup>

The Provisional Intelligence Manual, published in 1918, provided a doctrinal overview of how the relatively new intelligence staff section should be viewed, and what functions should be performed. The manual stated that the intelligence service was co-equal with the operations functions of the General Staff and the two formed the major staff functions in war.<sup>30</sup> Although published by the Office

of the Chief of Staff, in reality intelligence continued to be subordinated to the Army War College. This subordination meant that the MID in general, and counterintelligence functions in specific, lacked independence of operations. Negative intelligence coverage in this manual was outlined in three doctrinal areas. There was the potential for a permanent enemy organization within the US Army or a temporary insertion of enemy agents into friendly lines during combat operations. The third area concerned the unorganized aliens whose actions could cause harm to operations or personnel or equipment of the US Army.<sup>31</sup>

The MID had established a two tier approach to counterintelligence. The regional CIP branch offices were created to protect strategically important bases and ports in CONUS, and to protect war information. Also, CIP units were created to provide counterintelligence support at the theater or operational level in France. The second tier was the establishment of the Counter Espionage (CE) system within subordinate commands throughout the US Army.

The unit intelligence officer under the 1918 manual was responsible for conducting counterespionage operations and investigations under the technical control of the MID, G2, WDGS. The intelligence officers at the various departments and commands were responsible for observing, identifying, recruiting and controlling operatives to perform counterespionage operations. The major concern and

perceived threat in 1918 was espionage and subversion directed against soldiers by foreign agents, or by liberal elements within American society. The intelligence officers in the subordinate commands were to develop agents or operative networks using the same principles and practices to recruit and handle espionage agents. The manual stated that one operative for every 50 men was desirable, and one for every 100 men was the minimum ratio to be effective.<sup>32</sup> The mission of these operatives was to observe and report subversive behavior and identify potential espionage agents of foreign powers. Penetration of subversive organizations, to include labor movements, was encouraged to gather the required information.<sup>33</sup>

In March 1920, the decision was made to discontinue unit-level CE operations. The intelligence officers in the departments, corps areas, and service commands were instructed to return all CE manuals to the MID and shut down operations. The letters of instruction stated that the war was over and the German Secret Service was no longer a danger. The threat from communists and the various radical organizations in the United States could be countered by instructing the noncommissioned officer to be vigilant and keep these influences from their soldiers.<sup>34</sup> However, the traditional tactical counterintelligence functions of camouflage, document security, and censorship were continued.

The next doctrinal guidance was produced in 1939. The US Army's Operations Manual, Field Service Regulation Manual 100-5 (Tentative) contained a chapter entitled "Intelligence and Counterinformation" and focused on the tactical requirements for both areas. Although entitled "Counterinformation," this chapter described the traditional tactical level counterintelligence functions. The areas described were censorship, night movement, use of covered approaches and camouflage, counterreconnaissance, secrecy, operations security, and counterespionage.<sup>35</sup> The counterespionage functions at the tactical level were more of a support role for operations conducted and controlled by the theater intelligence service.

Field Manual 30-25, Military Intelligence: Counterintelligence was published in 1940. This was the first doctrinal counterintelligence publication produced for general distribution throughout the US Army. Previously all knowledge and documentation for counterintelligence was maintained under strict control with very limited distribution. One tenet of counterintelligence organizations over the previous 22 years had been to limit even the knowledge that counterintelligence existed in the US Army.<sup>36</sup>

The manual focused completely on the tactical functions of counterintelligence. Major topics included guidance on concealment, secrecy discipline, movements,

preparation and use of documents, censorship, and counterpropaganda. Another topic addressed was how to deal with news correspondents, photographers, and visitors.<sup>37</sup> This had become a major concern to commanders because of the rapid manner in which journalists could transmit news to millions of people. The concern was that critical mission information would also be transmitted to the enemy. Individual correspondence from soldiers had always been censored, but this was now extended to include all journalists.<sup>38</sup>

The War Department also produced Technical Manual 30-215 (Tentative) on counterintelligence in 1941. This manual was sent to the field for comments and formally published in 1943 as Technical Manual, 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps. No other publications existed that provided doctrine for the operational and strategic counterintelligence functions. This manual provided organizational, administrative, training, logistical and operational guidance which was targeted at the CIP and its successor, the CIC.<sup>39</sup>

Based on the above research, there was little, if any doctrine to guide the CIP and counterintelligence functions in the US Army prior to 1941. Although this would ordinarily be a significant problem for larger organizations, this was truly not the case for the CIP.

Doctrinal guidance and training could be passed by word of mouth in a corps of between six and 25 personnel.

### Training

The initial 50 CIP sergeants sent to France in 1917 to support the American Expeditionary Force did not receive any formal training in their field prior to departure from the United States. Colonel Van Deman attempted to recruit investigators from detective agencies located in New York and New Orleans. He also placed advertisements in local newspapers to recruit individuals. The basic qualifications needed by the recruits were fluency in German and/or French, possession of a general military aptitude, and completion at least a high school education. The mission to screen and recruit these individuals was given to an officer with an investigative background and fluency in French.<sup>40</sup>

What the CIP received was a mixed bag of individuals whose backgrounds ran the gamut from Harvard graduates to Louisiana Cajuns. Several individuals had criminal records and there was at least one communist. The recruitment of a communist would prove to be very ironic based upon the mission of the CIP and the focus on communist subversion immediately following WW I. The 50 men who were recruited were shipped to Europe on 12 October 1917, and arrived at St. Nazaire. The bulk of the 50-man contingent trained under the British Intelligence Service at Le Havre,

France.<sup>41</sup> Officers from the MID led the contingent, and like the sergeants, were detailed from other branches for intelligence duty. The officers participated in the training with the British which constituted the first semiformal training for officers in counterintelligence within the US Army.<sup>42</sup>

This training focused on the mastering of techniques, and lessons learned by the British from their three years of experiences in WW I. The Americans also copied the British system of creating card files of suspects (white, black and gray lists) and preparing counterespionage summaries.<sup>43</sup> White, black and gray lists are a counterintelligence file system used to identify and categorize individuals regarding their actual or potential relationship to US forces.<sup>44</sup> This file system is still used by counterintelligence units in the US Army. Training under the British Intelligence Service continued until the Armistice was signed.<sup>45</sup>

There are no known records available that describe the nature of training for the 250 CIP agents that would eventually operate in CONUS between 1917 and the early 1920s. Training was most likely conducted with other federal agencies and civilian police departments. The level of training probably differed from that required for the soldiers who deployed to France, who were recruited as linguists with investigative skills. In this case, the goal was only to recruit personnel with investigative skills.

Also the MID probably recruited heavily from the individuals already trained by other federal and civilian agencies.

Only limited information is available regarding the training for CIP personnel between 1918 and 1939. It appears that the training focus was on investigative matters based upon the heavy emphasis on the background investigation of individuals recruited for the US Army and the mission statements for the CIP during this period. Those missions were primarily internal security and subversion investigations. The limited number of soldiers involved in the CIP and limited War Department budget made the establishment of a special CIP school impossible.<sup>46</sup> Individuals brought into the CIP were probably trained with the Bureau of Investigations (forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), large metropolitan police departments, and private detective agencies.

The need quickly arose to provide specialized training to the new recruits as the US Army geared up for the Second World War. The Secretary of War directed that the CIP Investigators Training School be established on 18 January 1941. Responsibility for the school was given to the Chief, CIP who was now a subordinate of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS. (The curriculum for the course is at Table 3.) The school was established in a single room in the US Army War College at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. The school began instruction for the first class of students

on 24 February 1941.<sup>47</sup> The training centered on investigative procedures, surveillance, and the organization of other investigative agencies (e.g., FBI, Post Office, metropolitan police, etc.). It is significant to note that only nine hours of the 182 hour training course dealt with the subjects of sabotage and espionage/counterespionage.<sup>48</sup>

The training course dealt exclusively with preparation of agents to work in CONUS rather than at the operational or tactical level. The school had been fashioned after the FBI school, and therefore focused on criminal investigative matters. No text books or course materials were available for the students, so five full-time instructors provided students with copies of lecture notes. These notes provided an instructional guide and reference material upon graduation.<sup>49</sup> The instructors were assisted by FBI agents and various investigators of the other agencies identified in the curriculum.<sup>50</sup>

A one-month special training course was developed in April 1941, to train 48 commissioned officers from the CONUS units and an overseas command on industrial and plant security.<sup>51</sup> This class was the first formal training for a large number of officers and was the beginning of specialized training for officers in counterintelligence.

The growth of the CIP and training requirements forced the move of the training course to larger quarters. There was some bureaucratic maneuvering on the part of the

Provost Marshal to merge the CIP with the criminal investigator function, with both elements subordinate to the Provost Marshal. Furthermore, the Provost Marshal wanted to bring the CIP Investigations Training School under the control of the Military Police School.<sup>52</sup> The final decision was made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, WDGS that the two services would remain separate. However, by the time that decision was reached, the CIP school had already moved to Chicago.<sup>53</sup>

The CIP Investigations Training School in Chicago began formal training on 10 November 1941. The new location provided adequate space and offered many training benefits, such as the use of the laboratories at the Chicago Police Department, Northwestern University and Underwriters Laboratory. These laboratories were used to provide demonstrations on criminal and technical counterintelligence investigations. By the time of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the CIP was preparing a second set of classroom areas to expand the training site once more. The next training class would increase the seats for students and include a recurring course of instruction for officers.<sup>54</sup>

#### Operations

Prior to the First World War, no federal agency existed that had a significant investigative capability. Most of the federal agencies that did possess investigative

capabilities were very small and their efforts were uncoordinated. Most domestic investigations were conducted by private detective agencies, against labor activists and the labor movements.<sup>55</sup>

Initial CIP doctrine and operations were molded by the environment at that time. The CIP was not truly a corps, but individual sergeants detailed from infantry duties. The focus of operations was primarily on the investigation of sabotage, subversion and a limited amount of espionage investigations. Most of the time and effort were spent in developing informant networks to prevent subversion in the ranks, sabotage of US Army equipment, and protection of military movements.

The CIP conducted operations in conjunction with, and received intelligence from, civilian detective agencies. The CIP also aggressively investigated civilians that had no direct relationship to the US Army. These investigations were conducted because of subversive acts (e.g., unrest in units and questioning military authority, etc.) that could affect soldiers in the area. The CIP also made extensive use of numerous private organizations that were established to stress Americanization and patriotism. These organizations also were created to combat pacifists and subversion of the national will by internal and external threats.<sup>56</sup>

The American Protective League (APL) is a good example of one of these organizations. This league was established in 1917 and offered volunteer manpower to conduct investigations. The US Army and the Bureau of Investigations made much use of this organization after the outbreak of WW I. The APL recruited and certified private citizens as agents and directed domestic intelligence collection. The reports produced were provided to both the US Army and Bureau of Investigation. The use of private detective services and private organizations would continue for approximately 20 years.<sup>57</sup>

The CIP element that deployed to France in 1917 provided operational-level counterintelligence to the American Expeditionary Force. The majority of the CIP efforts were to safeguard friendly order of battle data. It was thought that this information would be of the highest value, and the most sought after information by German espionage agents. The CIP in France also screened refugee and civilian population movements for suspected German agents, conducting checks of local personnel employed by the US Army, and rounding up suspected agents in new territory recently liberated. The white, black and gray lists previously mentioned were used to guide the CIP in their area of operations. The CIP performed these duties both in the combat zone in support of the division, and in the rear

area to protect ports, depots, rest facilities and over 30 French cities.<sup>58</sup>

Within one month of entering WW I, the CIP and the MID were learning the extent of the German espionage system in France. The Germans had developed extensive operations that touched virtually all levels of society. Hotel owners, mutual benefit associates, and foreign laborers working in France were all recruited by German espionage agents. The Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Force stated that "in this war the United States is pitted against an enemy with a splendid spy system."<sup>59</sup>

The CIP found the same level of effort by the communists from Russia. By the close of the First World War, the US Army's concern shifted to countersubversion operations and loyalty investigations. This new danger was not an invention of intelligence personnel types to keep the CIP. One of the primary missions for communists in the United States was the subversion of soldiers and sailors. This mission was based upon instructions from the Moscow-based Comintern organization to the American Communist Party.<sup>60</sup> The subversion campaign, coupled with the Soviet penetration of the highest levels of American government, signalled the significant trouble America would have with subversion and espionage over the next 20 years. The MID was powerless to mount operations against this threat. Within 15 months after the end of WW I, the CIP had

a total of 18 investigators. The majority of CIP assets were stationed at overseas locations. This was done to protect overseas bases, but also because the American people had become very sensitive to internal investigations. This sensitivity caused the Secretary of War to discontinue the CE system in the units.<sup>61</sup>

By 1920, the counterintelligence program in the US Army had all but ceased to exist. There was little or no counterintelligence effort at the strategic level. The counterintelligence program at the tactical level was now restricted to purely tactical counterintelligence functions, such as camouflage, and noise and light discipline. The only substantial counterintelligence effort was performed at the operational level which was limited to between six and 25 investigators worldwide. This situation continued for the next 20 years.

By 1939, the key agencies conducting counterintelligence operations for United States were the FBI, the MID of the WDGS, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Department of the Navy. On 26 June 1939, President Roosevelt directed that all espionage, counterespionage and sabotage matters would fall under the jurisdiction of the FBI, the MID and the ONI.<sup>62</sup> These agencies were to form a committee to coordinate their activities. A working delimitation agreement was jointly produced and became effective on 28 June 1940. The formal

agreement was contained in the Delimitation Agreement of 1942 that covered jurisdiction and foreign operations. The major provisions of the Delimitation Agreement were that:

a. The FBI assumed sole responsibility for all counterintelligence investigations involving civilians within the US and its territories, with the exception of the Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine Islands.

b. The FBI assumed the same responsibility for cases directed from foreign countries, whenever requested by the State, War or Navy Departments.

c. The MID assumed responsibility for all counterintelligence investigations and disposition of cases occurring within the military establishment. This included civilians employed on a military installation or under military control. The MID performed the same duties for the Canal Zone, Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands.

d. The ONI a similar responsibility for the investigation of cases occurring within the naval establishment. This included civilians employed by the Navy or under Naval control. The ONI performed the same duties in Guam and American Samoa.

e. The FBI took the lead to combat the civilian fifth column groups.<sup>63</sup>

The Delimitation Agreement set the framework for all counterintelligence players from the national down to the tactical level. There continued to be gray areas that

required refinement. The agreement stated that the FBI would handle "cases directed from foreign countries" caused confusion regarding exactly who had jurisdiction in cases referred from overseas locations.<sup>64</sup> There was also a question as to who was responsible for fifth column investigations at defense plants.<sup>65</sup> President Roosevelt further directed that all foreign operations were to be divided among the three agencies. The FBI would be responsible for the Western Hemisphere, with the US Army and Navy responsible for the rest of the world as necessary.<sup>66</sup>

The Delimitations Agreement seriously limited US Army counterintelligence investigations in CONUS. However, both the US Army and Navy interpreted the agreement as requiring them to merely coordinate operations with the FBI. Additionally, investigations would be executed if the FBI could not or would not respond to service requirements.<sup>67</sup> This agreement did not truly matter under the restriction in manpower and funding under which the CIP operated at the time. What was viewed as a very good agreement by the US Army in 1942, would cause significant restrictions for US Army counterintelligence in the future.

As the Nazis took power in Germany in the early 1930s, and the Japanese span of conquest and influence spread in the Pacific basin, the requirement for a larger force to counter espionage, sabotage and subversion was readily apparent to the military leadership in the War

Department. The total espionage case load handled by various agencies in the United States in the early 1930s was approximately 35 cases a year. That number increased to 250 cases in 1938 and leaped to 1600 case by 1939.<sup>68</sup> The bulk of these cases involved German or Japanese agents attempting to collect military or economic information. By 1939, the German and Japanese military forces were engaged in open warfare that started the Second World War. The status of the CIP remained so constrained and limited as to be ineffective against the increasing threat and case load. The CIP was a direct reflection of the unpreparedness of the US Army for the immediate future. The situation did not change until the end of 1940, when it became clear to most that it was only a matter of time before America would be at war again.

## CHAPTER 3

### ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

#### Overview

As the US Army moved from a peacetime to wartime footing, the War Department hurriedly attempted to develop doctrine, organize, train, and equip the military forces. This held true for the field of counterintelligence as well. There was little time for this effort between the beginning of the US Army expansion in 1940 until America entered World War II (WW II). On 6 December 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) was placed under the control and direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff. On this date, the Corps had an authorization of 513 personnel and had begun to execute its responsibilities under the Delimitation Agreement.<sup>1</sup> With the coming of war, the Corps found itself no longer in the awkward position of having to beg for authorizations or money. In fact, opposite problems occurred. How could the Corps expand, procure people and train them to handle the monumental tasks at hand? These tasks were made even more difficult due to indifference to counterintelligence over the last 20 years.

When the first contingent of American troops landed in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), a small group of Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel were included in the troop list. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were on duty with all major headquarters down to the division level by November 1943.<sup>2</sup> All CIC elements were assigned to the G-2 Division, War Department, and were attached to various combat commands in the theater. In March 1944, the CIC operational and administrative control was transferred to the Commander, ETO. The CIC Detachments were subassigned to the combat commands and placed under the control of the G-2 for that unit. In June 1944, the CIC in the ETO was comprised of 1053 officers and agents.<sup>3</sup> The CIP had come a long way in less than four years.

#### Organization

With the American buildup in preparation for WW II, the CIP quickly grew to an authorized strength of 1026 noncommissioned officers.<sup>4</sup> The Corps required experienced personnel to deploy with the new overseas commands being formed, and to train new CIP personnel. The Corps deployed personnel to unusual places such as Trinidad, Jamaica, and Antigua.<sup>5</sup> The need to protect strategic bases in the Continental United States (CONUS), train new CIP personnel, and deploy experienced personnel to perform missions overseas presented a leadership and management challenge of monumental proportion.

As the Corps grew and changed, a recommendation was made to change the name of the CIP to the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Chief of the Military Intelligence Division (MID), Colonel Holbrook, approved the name change and the Adjutant General published an order on 13 December 1941, to this effect. The name change was to be effective on 1 January 1942, and all enlisted members currently in the CIP would be transferred in their present grade to the new CIC.<sup>6</sup> The name change more aptly described the mission and functions of the organization. Many organizational changes were made in 1941 and 1942 based on lessons learned from the field. The CIC now had some wartime experience to go with the new name on which to build the new organization.

The MID, Assistant Chief of Staff G2, War Department General Staff (WDGS) abruptly set about to provide an organization on which to build, identify, and train new CIC personnel. It also expanded mission capabilities in CONUS, and established CIC units in newly formed defense commands overseas. There were three major problems that inhibited the MID from getting a head start on the wartime requirements: the CIC did not have a table of organization on which to build; it did not have a specially trained officer corps to lead the CIC; and it was not widely known throughout the US Army that the CIC even existed.<sup>7</sup>

Between the latter part of 1941 and the first few months of 1942, the MID set about to correct the above

problems. A tentative organization for the new CIC was developed. (Table 4 depicts the organization for the CIC to support the operational and tactical level formations.) The decision was made to provide CIC support down to division level. By 10 June 1943, the CIC had 100 detachments supporting Army units.<sup>8</sup> The placement of CIC detachments with troop commands had a great impact on the success that the CIC enjoyed during WW II. However, meeting the requirements to rapidly expand the CIC to meet this organizational structure caused major problems during the formation of the CIC.

The growth of the MID and CIC required changes to policy and control of CIC operational assets. The Inspector General made several recommendations which the Deputy Chief of Staff implemented on 25 November 1943. Counter Intelligence Corps assets would now be distributed to the various theaters and commands for use and be made based on a recently developed table of organization. These commands would exercise total operational control of CIC assets through the G2. The G2, WDGS would no longer provide day-to-day control of operations, but would be responsible to establish Army policy, coordinate the procurement and deployment of CIC units, and provide specialized training.<sup>9</sup>

These actions would have far reaching implications for the CIC and the US Army in Europe. The implications of these recommendations changed the operational control and

mission focus of CIC assets. The changes centralized policy making for the CIC in the War Department, while decentralizing the execution, control and missions of the CIC to the theater or service commanders. These actions would have significant positive impact on the ability of the CIC to effectively support US forces in the ETO. These also went a long way in educating commanders about what the CIC was and what it could do for them. These assets were no longer War Department assets, rather the theater commander's responsibility to use and employ. The policy changes brought the CIC from an organization that coexisted with the operational forces to full integration with warfighting commands.<sup>10</sup>

Due to the rapid build-up of forces, the CIC assets were shipped to the ETO before a doctrine, organization, structure or Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) was developed. The decision was made in the ETO to form CIC detachments and provide for the distribution of CIC assets as shown in Table 5. Counter Intelligence Corps assets were echeloned in detachments to every level of command having a general staff. The detachment commander for the unit supporting the Headquarters, ETO was designated the Chief, CIC, ETO, US Army. This individual was dual-hatted as the operational commander and had administrative and technical control over all CIC assets in theater. All CIC units were assigned to the Headquarters, ETO and attached to

subordinate commands. The G2 at each echelon had operational control of the CIC assets with the headquarters company commander of the parent unit having administrative control (i.e., rations, quarters and supplies).<sup>11</sup>

The CIC experience in the ETO between 1942 and the middle of 1944 was primarily in England, North Africa and Italy. The experiences and lessons learned in these areas shaped the missions and actions of the CIC once they landed in Europe on D-Day and throughout the fight into Germany.

The US Army standardized the structure and purpose of counterintelligence assets with the publication of the CIC Detachment TO&E 30-500 on 24 January 1944. The CIC also began to plan ahead for occupation duty in both Germany and Japan that would begin in 1945. (The organization and personnel assets for the CIC detachments is shown in Table 6.) The equipment authorized by the TO&E 30-500 issued only one non-standard item (civilian vehicles) to the CIC detachments. These vehicles were only issued to detachments receiving approval from the Commanding General or Theater Commander. All other authorized equipment was standard combat gear and included the M1 carbine, Thompson submachine gun, and the entrenching axe.<sup>12</sup> (Table 7 contains the equipment authorized under TO&E 30-500.)

Non-standard equipment was procured and issued to CIC units by the War Department. This equipment included .38 caliber revolvers, Minox cameras, portable typewriters,

fingerprint cameras, latent fingerprint kits, handcuffs, and listening and recording devices.<sup>13</sup> This equipment was issued from the CIC supply depots in CONUS and units deployed with this supplemental issue. Upon arrival in the ETO, units were issued additional equipment on an individual detachment basis, depending upon their operational needs.<sup>14</sup>

#### Doctrine

The doctrine for US Army counterintelligence evolved from the experiences of World War I and the road to war in the 1940s. Although it does not appear that the leadership of Military Intelligence set out to develop a doctrine that would be appropriate at the three levels of operations, that is what happened. The doctrine developed prior to 1943 was more in reaction to events rather than from coherent thought. Since there was no doctrine, the training program constituted, and was in fact the de facto doctrine. The focus of the first two years of WW II was procurement and fielding of CIC detachments to meet the growing demand. A coherent doctrine for employment of counterintelligence assets was not developed until the war was almost over.

The mission for counterintelligence in the US Army remained basically unchanged from 1917 until 1945. This mission was to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence collection against friendly forces. The mission was broken into three counterintelligence functions of counterespionage, countersubversion and

countersabotage.<sup>15</sup> The 1940 version of Field Manual (FM) 30-25, Military Intelligence: Counterintelligence, was referred to by both the 1941 and 1944 versions of FM 100-5 for details on this subject. The object of FM 30-25 was to identify "the various measures that may be adopted to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy intelligence system."<sup>16</sup> Field Manual 30-25 and Chapter 7, FM 100-5 were designed for use by tactical commanders to protect their commands from enemy espionage, battlefield intelligence systems and maintain freedom of action through tactical surprise. The 1944 version of FM 100-5, Operations restated the above mission and outlined the application of tactical counterintelligence measures.<sup>17</sup>

Field Manual 30-25 was a guide for commanders on counterintelligence measures, but it was not a doctrinal guide for CIC operations. Undoubtedly, CIC units applied the guidance in FM 30-25 to the same degree as all other units in the US Army. All CIC personnel operating at the theater level and below were required, or should have been required, to know, understand, and be able to articulate the need for these counterintelligence precautions. The CIC detachment would advise tactical commanders on how to improve their security, but this was not the main purpose of the CIC detachments.<sup>18</sup>

Technical Manual (TM) 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps, provided basic principles for the operations of the

CIC and established the responsibilities of the MID, G2, WDGS and the commanding officer of the CIC detachment.<sup>19</sup> The manual also stated that its provisions applied equally to CIC activities in the zone of the interior as in theater of operations.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Inspector General and approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the G2, WDGS was responsible for all policy issues governing the CIC and procurement of peculiar items required for the CIC. These items included confidential funds, special equipment, and badges and credentials. The control and employment of the CIC detachments were the responsibilities of the supported commander under the guidelines established by the G2, WDGS.<sup>20</sup> The CIC detachment commander was responsible for executing missions assigned by the supported commander within guidelines established by the G2, WDGS. The detachment commander would also serve as the operational advisor to the S2, G2 or Director of Intelligence to which the detachment was attached.

Based upon TM 30-215, the CIC detachments within the ETO were authorized direct communications with other intelligence organizations on operational matters and the Office of the Chief, CIC regarding administrative matters. The CIC detachments were also authorized direct communications with adjacent CIC detachments as required. Based upon established ETO policy, CIC detachments generally

did not contact the Office of the Chief, CIC in Washington, DC.<sup>21</sup> Generally, all requests were forwarded through the Commander of the CIC detachment supporting the Headquarters, ETO.

The missions and functions of the CIC were broken into two categories of general investigative and rear echelon support, and field security support. The execution of the missions defined below were constrained within CONUS by the Delimitation Agreement of 1942, and outside of CONUS by the agreements within the country where the CIC operated. The following missions were identified in TM 30-215.

a. General Investigative and Rear Echelon Support.

(1) Safeguarding military information.

The CIC was responsible to assist in the compliance and enforcement of security for military information. The guidelines for information security were contained in Army Regulation 380-5, Safeguarding Military Information. The CIC conducted surveys to ensure compliance, offered recommendations through the G2/S2 for methods to achieve the appropriate level of security, and investigated violations of this regulation. The CIC also had the mission to conduct periodic security briefings to troop units regarding safeguarding of military information.

(2) Frontier control. The CIC was responsible for supporting the control of national borders in areas under military authority. This mission entailed the close

cooperation with the Military Police and civil-military authorities, but did not include frontier control. Rather, the mission was to recommend measures to regulate entry into the area under military jurisdiction to help ensure that effective control measures were taken that would preclude enemy agent infiltration.

(3) General security against enemy agents. This mission included the investigation of actual or potential instances of espionage, sabotage, anti-allied propaganda, subversion, disaffection, fifth column activities, and harmful rumors. This mission also dictated the conduct of surveys for security of rear area commands, communications, administrative and logistical centers, and recommend countermeasures to enhance protection of these centers. The TM specified that CIC assets would not be used to institute the security changes, but should be used to periodically check the effectiveness of security measures. The CIC was also charged with recommending measures for controlling the movement of civilians under military jurisdiction. Additionally, the CIC was to maintain liaison with the Signal Intelligence Service, which was responsible for providing information regarding enemy activity in friendly areas through signals intercept.

(4) General security duties. This mission was to perform necessary investigations for other counterintelligence purposes. The TM stated that every

effort would be made to limit the amount of other counterintelligence investigations so as not to detract from the more important counterintelligence missions.

b. Field Security Support. This portion of the mission was to support tactical operations in the forward area. The primary focus was to neutralize enemy agent activity and determine potentially hostile personnel in newly liberated territory. These missions were conducted by searching enemy headquarters, personnel, and seizure of documents that might provide the required information. Telephone exchanges and radio stations were immediately seized and protected until these facilities could be turned over to appropriate military personnel. Along the same lines, all civilian communications (e.g., telephone, mail, radio, telegraph, etc.) were halted. Local officials were contacted in an attempt to determine which individuals were part of enemy party organizations. The CIC detachments were also responsible for controlling and screening refugees to prevent enemy agent infiltration and establish informant networks. Tactical operations supported included the search of friendly headquarters, bivouac areas and billets in the event of withdrawal to ensure documents and material useful to the enemy were not left behind.<sup>22</sup>

Two additional functions were assigned to the CIC to perform as required by circumstances. The first function was the conduct of liaison with other agencies (i.e.,

military, allied, and host nation). The other function was to provide advice on friendly offensive intelligence collection planning regarding enemy counterintelligence measures.<sup>23</sup>

By the end of 1943, the CIC finally had a coherent doctrine, mission, semi-standard organization and structure and distribution scheme for assets throughout the US Army. The CIC had undergone significant change since 1941, but faced a challenge equally as great to train personnel to execute the new doctrine and missions.

#### Training

Effective 1 January 1942, the CIP Investigator's School was changed to the CIC Investigator's Training School. The course curriculum remained unchanged for the next 18 months in spite of the fact that the scope of counterintelligence was growing dramatically. The training course lasted 26 days for both enlisted and officer personnel.<sup>24</sup> The focus of the training was exclusively on preparing potential CIC agents to operate in CONUS. There were no provisions or classes in preparing agents to operate at overseas locations, function with combat formations, or support theater-level operations.<sup>25</sup>

On 3 February 1942, the faculty of the CIC school in Chicago was instructed to develop an Officer Candidate School (OCS). This plan had been approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff G1, WDGS as a method to produce CIC

officers.<sup>26</sup> The officers were selected by their immediate supervisor, and subsequently approved by the G2, WDGS. This course was a two month school and was 628 hours in length with 306 hours devoted to general military studies.<sup>27</sup> The course trained the candidates in very basic squad and platoon level combat, and military intelligence skills. On 13 June 1942, 30 candidates were commissioned second lieutenants in Military Intelligence. This would be the only Military Intelligence OCS class ever trained.<sup>28</sup>

The Craig Board, which supervised officer accessions and training, did not grant approval for the direct commissioning of officers for the CIC. This board had determined that this OCS was not within the accepted definition of a candidate school. The disapproval was based on the fact that the MID did not have sufficient personnel to warrant separate schools, or enough demand for commissioned officers to justify an OCS. Officer candidates for military intelligence would need to attend one of the combat arms OCS courses. This resulted in the ongoing problem of using detailed officers for CIC duties, and continued the problems of instability in CIC leadership due to the rapid turn over of officers.<sup>29</sup>

The formal counterintelligence training was determined to be inadequate by a G2, WDGS staff study completed on 19 September 1942. There was a severe shortage of instructors, lack of visual aids, and training facilities

and billets were deemed inadequate. Also, there was no approved directive to procure and assign personnel once trained. Frequently, officers returned to their respective commands and normally did not perform counterintelligence duties, much less intelligence duties.<sup>30</sup>

Major General Strong, G2, WDGS took quick action to rectify these problems. He developed and implemented plans to make the school an Advanced Training School (ATS). The ATS concept tasked the various service commands (corps area commands were changed to service commands) for preliminary CIC training. The CIC school established the basic training requirements and a memorandum was forwarded to all service commands directing that the preliminary school be established. The ATS would be used to train selected agents and officers from the service commands. This approach to training eased the burden on the CIC school but probably did not improve the training quality for the individual student.<sup>31</sup>

The first major change in formal counterintelligence training was not made until July 1943. The need to train CIC personnel to operate at overseas locations and with combat units was finally realized. By this time the CIC was involved in operations in numerous theaters and had gained invaluable experience in tactical counterintelligence operations. In order to update the school, the curriculum was completely overhauled and experienced CIC personnel were

brought back from overseas theaters to become instructors. Although the previous instructors had been very competent, all had similar backgrounds such as lawyers, and federal, state or local police organizations. The new instructors brought actual experience from combat zones and could readily address overseas operations. Another change that significantly shifted the emphasis and climate of the school was that now military uniforms replaced civilian clothes. This signified a change in thought and self perception of the CIC and an added emphasis on being a soldier.<sup>32</sup>

The revised curriculum shifted to support overseas operations and included instruction in allied and enemy intelligence and police services, troop security, and frontier and travel control. Training in investigation, surveillance, interrogation and report writing were maintained in the course. The more technical areas of microphone installation and moulages were deleted to make room for the new subjects.<sup>33</sup>

The training for CIC personnel was divided into three areas: basic military training; basic investigative training; and advanced training for selected individuals. All perspective agents would attend a Basic Training Center for eight weeks. Afterwards, the individuals would receive CIC training by one of the service commands. This training would be a four-week course and be composed of over 200 hours of investigative instruction, and over 70 hours of

technical counterintelligence instruction. Each service command established a CIC training school that generally provided four weeks of training to their perspective CIC agents. The school was placed under the CIC detachment supporting that particular command. The detachment commander had administrative control of all training. This training was followed by an apprenticeship at a CIC detachment for an additional four weeks. Further individual training was available for selected agents at the CIC Training School in Chicago.<sup>34</sup>

The service commands were permanently stationed in different geographical regions in CONUS. All CIC personnel were trained by the various service commands for use in that command. The problem of training CIC personnel for deploying units needed to be addressed. The solution was that the service commands would continue to conduct the preliminary training for those agents identified to deploy overseas. A staging base concept was developed to provide specialized training for counterintelligence operations in support of overseas operational and tactical forces. The staging base was to be a place where CIC units deploying overseas could receive additional training, bring the detachments up to strength on equipment, and prepare soldiers for tactical conditions.<sup>35</sup>

On 3 July 1943, the CIC Staging Areas were activated at the Army Air Base, Logan Field, Baltimore, Maryland. The

Staging bases would soon be moved to Fort Holabird, Maryland. Training would be for eight weeks and be comprised of marksmanship, map reading, general field survival subjects (i.e., motor vehicle use and maintenance, refresher intelligence training, language refresher courses, and escape and evasion training). The training at the staging area included officers and provided some integrated training. These officers were also tagged as student instructors and taught part of the course. Upon completion of this training, units were shipped to the various theaters or the zone of interior to be married up with their tactical units.<sup>36</sup>

Selected CIC personnel deploying overseas were given specialized language training. A 13-week condensed language program was established at Berlitz Language Schools located in Baltimore, New York, Chicago and San Francisco. This program was established in September 1943, and trained a total of 150 agents in French, German, Italian and Spanish. This program did address the critical shortage of linguists; however, each class was limited to five soldiers.<sup>37</sup> This program fulfilled only a small portion of the language requirements for the CIC.

Due to these shortcomings, language training was conducted at the detachment level in the ETO to maintain language proficiency and train new personnel in French and German. Additionally, the Headquarters, CIC, ETO instituted

language training in September 1943 to train more CIC personnel.<sup>38</sup>

By June 1944, the War Department had developed a training scheme that adequately prepared CIC personnel for all levels of operations. This program lasted 29 weeks and included basic military training for 17 weeks, security intelligence for four weeks, and general intelligence instruction for eight weeks. Additionally, CIC personnel being assigned to Army Air Corps units received eight weeks of aircraft services instruction.<sup>39</sup>

By the time the War Department had developed a coherent training program, WW II was ending. This training program was developed too late to have a significant impact on operations in WW II. Most of the CIC detachments were formed, deployed and operated in their respective theaters, or in CONUS by the time the training program matured. Due to the shortcomings of the language training program and the increased need for German linguists, another language training program was initiated. The Chief CIC, ETO recommended on 23 December 1944, that CIC personnel deploying to the ETO be provided at least some basic German language training before arriving in the theater. A program was initiated at the University of Pennsylvania to meet this need. Training started on 23 February 1945, and each course lasted four weeks. A total of 263 agents had been trained when the course was discontinued in June 1945.<sup>40</sup>

In spite of the CIC training efforts and programs, there were cases where CIC personnel arrived in theater with little or no instruction. Some CIC personnel were deployed without the benefit of any intelligence training, while others arrived in theater not having attended any basic military instruction (i.e., boot camp). These situations occurred due to the rapid growth of the CIC training organizations, changes in how CIC personnel would be trained (e.g., by the CIC, service commands) and the almost constant change in the flow (i.e., how personnel arrived in the CIC, identification of personnel at recruiting stations, etc.). Although CIC training was changed to provide overseas training, the leadership in the ETO still thought the CONUS training effort did not adequately prepare personnel. The assessment was that CIC personnel were untrained in basic soldiering skills and counterintelligence skills to support tactical operations.<sup>41</sup> The primary cause of training deficiencies was due to a majority of the training time being spent on investigation of ordinary crimes. The training did not foster the idea that the CIC agents were soldiers first and counterintelligence specialists second. Soldiers were generally unprepared for the harsher conditions of field life and were not physically prepared for field duty. Previous training did not prepare personnel to operate at overseas locations or support combat

operations because the CONUS training had focused solely on strategic level operations.<sup>42</sup>

To correct these CONUS-based training deficiencies and develop competent CIC personnel, training was conducted in the ETO. Because of time and mission constraints, CIC personnel did not receive all the necessary training required to perform their mission. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the United Kingdom waiting for the invasion of the European continent conducted training as a part-time activity while conducting missions. The missions of these units focused primarily on internal security of the invasion forces. The training conducted covered a wide range of topics. Detachments that were attached to divisions and corps participated in field training exercises. The detachments hoped to simulate operations, and to develop and resolve problems that may be experienced in actual combat operations. A select number of CIC personnel participated in various British combat training courses. To provide additional combat training, a one month infantry course was developed for the CIC. This course was given by the American School Center and trained a total of 180 CIC personnel prior to D-Day.<sup>43</sup>

Special orientation courses were developed for most countries in Western Europe. Orientation training was instituted by the CIC Headquarters in the ETO that provided a 30-day overview of Western Europe, instruction on possible

missions after the invasion, and operational methods. This headquarters also prepared country study books. These books contained political, economic, social, and geographical data, as well as descriptions of international law and laws covering occupation forces. These book were distributed to every CIC detachment bound for the European continent. A small number of CIC personnel were sent to train with the British Intelligence School for more intensive orientation and counterintelligence instruction.<sup>44</sup>

Perhaps one of the most effective training tools employed were the monthly bulletins produced by the CIC Headquarters in England. These bulletins were published to give CIC personnel background knowledge on the conditions they could expect upon arriving on the continent, summaries of current operations, and most importantly, lesson learned from other theaters (i.e., North Africa, Italy, Pacific, etc.). After the invasion, the lessons learned reports continued to be disseminated to all detachments. These publications provided a great source of intelligence service, military and civil security, and information for other units regarding types of missions to be performed, best methods to employ, what methods proved successful, and what methods were unsuccessful.<sup>45</sup>

The training of new agents sent to the theater after D-Day, or individuals recruited from in theater units was a significant challenge. A large number of German linguists

were recruited into the CIC. All newly arrived individuals were assigned to a detachment and went through an informal training period. Training focused on counterintelligence methods, jurisdiction, and German travel control.<sup>46</sup>

By the end of WW II, significant changes had been made regarding all aspects of US Army counterintelligence. The CIP was renamed the CIC, and experienced exponential growth in personnel in a very short period of time. The rapid expansion of the CIC caused numerous problems. The lack of prior war planning for counterintelligence caused the WDGS and the CIP to be extremely reactive in all areas. The CIP attempted to execute a non existent counterintelligence doctrine, while training new CIP personnel. Because of this situation, counterintelligence training in reality produced counterintelligence doctrine prior to 1943. Also, the CIC struggled to change operational procedures from one of a CONUS-based strategy, to one that supported tactical and operational warfighting. By the end of 1943, the CIC had evolved through a turbulence growth, but developed into a creditable organization with great potential for the warfighting commanders.

## CHAPTER 4

### OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

#### Overview

All Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) theoretically were responsible for the counterintelligence missions identified in Chapter 3. In reality, the missions performed by the various CIC detachments depended upon which echelon the detachment was attached to and the availability of time. The missions and functions of the divisional detachments were closely tied to support of combat operations and protection of the division. Their mission was rapid and limited in most cases due to the almost continuous movement of the division. The operations undertaken by the army group CIC detachments generally focused on security of the rear area, assistance to the armies by mobile CIC teams, and screening of civilian personnel and travel/movement control. The following discussion of the various echelons of counterintelligence in the ETO highlights their different focus, reinforcing nature, and evaluates the effectiveness of the entire counterintelligence effort.

The counterintelligence effort in the ETO was directed from the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Forces (SHAEF). The policy and responsibilities for allied counterintelligence from Operation Overlord to the end of hostilities were set forth in SHAEF Directive Number 7. Operation Overlord was the Allied plan for the invasion of the European continent in Northern France. This directive covered military security in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, relations with other intelligence agencies, inter- and intra-theater travel controls, security control of the civilian population, and procedures to handle suspected enemy agents. This directive did not increase the missions established by US Army policy, but expanded the coordination and provided procedural guidance for operations.<sup>3</sup>

#### Division

The primary mission of the divisional CIC detachments was to secure counterintelligence targets in the vicinity of the objective area. The principal targets were former enemy headquarters, government offices, centers of communication, stay behind agents and collaborators.<sup>4</sup> The primary focus of the CIC was to protect the division from sabotage or potential unrest while the division consolidated on the objective area and prepared for further action.<sup>5</sup> The quick action of the CIC detachments would provide great benefits to the counterintelligence effort and to the general intelligence collection mission for the division.

One of the first targets to be secured would be former enemy headquarters and government buildings. The documents seized from within these buildings provided a wealth of knowledge on party officials, collaborators and enemy agents or stay behinds. The document seizure was extremely important because it generally saved the detachment numerous man-hours of investigation. Also these documents provided proof of enemy activity that may not have been clear from even a lengthy counterintelligence investigation. The prompt exploitation of enemy documents generally set up a series of limited counterintelligence investigations leading to the rapid arrest or detention of collaborators. The seizure of enemy documents was of extreme importance not only to the CIC, but to the tactical intelligence collection and production of the division. These documents were to be scanned and sorted according to value and category (i.e., intelligence versus counterintelligence). This action was generally performed at the location of discovery or in the immediate vicinity at a friendly unit command post.<sup>6</sup>

The quick seizure of enemy documents could not be overemphasized. In fact, this action was made the recurring number one priority for the 1st Infantry Division (ID) CIC Detachment.<sup>7</sup> If these records were not located and seized immediately, the records were generally destroyed or disappeared. The problem generally was with American

soldiers looking for souvenirs or with the local German populace attempting to obtain information to better their situation or ensure their names were not contained in the files. The arrest and detention of Nazi officials and agents could begin immediately based upon captured records.<sup>8</sup>

Detachments were briefed in advance of major combat operations regarding the location of key targets. Suspected personnel were placed on black lists. This information was developed from multiple sources and indicated the interrelationships of the intelligence disciplines during the war. Information compiled through interrogation, order of battle analysis and counterintelligence was used to target all resources in the divisions for further intelligence collection. Usually, individuals on the black lists were identified by local officials in the area just overrun by the divisions. German mayors tended to be very helpful in identifying individuals who met the automatic arrest criteria, which was somewhat surprising to the CIC.<sup>9</sup>

Immediately after the shooting stopped, individuals on the black lists were located and arrested. Their interrogation and statements frequently led to follow up investigations and arrests of other individuals. These individuals were generally evacuated to the Army civilian detention cage.

Another major mission for the divisional CIC detachments was the screening of civilians. The purpose of

this mission was to detect enemy stay behind agents, line crossers and collaborators. The mission of the CIC was not to identify and document personnel, but the function of screening for enemy agents could best be accomplished in coordination with this operation. Combat was generally restricted to the forward areas of the division, generating a large refugee flow from these areas. Most of the refugee screening was conducted in the division or corps areas. Based upon earlier document seizures and investigations, CIC personnel could very quickly identify suspects and segregate them for special interrogation and investigation. This became a lucrative opportunity to quickly remove potential threats.<sup>10</sup>

While the amount and type of work the CIC detachments performed depended almost entirely on the mission of the division (e.g., attack, defend, withdraw, etc.), the factor that most influenced the actions of the CIC detachments was the element of time. Depending upon the length of time the division would remain in the area would dictate the amount and type of work the CIC detachment could accomplish.

The divisional detachments were frequently divided into subsections for operational purposes and contained between four and 18 personnel.<sup>11</sup> The detachments were composed, for the most part, of the standard type elements A1 and B1 from the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 30-500.<sup>12</sup> (See Tables 6 and 7) Very frequently, the

X 1

divisional detachment included more personnel than authorized under the TO&E. The detachments were authorized two commissioned officers: a captain as the commander and a lieutenant. The detachment headquarters was usually located in the vicinity of the division headquarters. The detachment's subsection of two or three special agents would be attached to each of the regiments or combat commands for employment. These elements worked closely with the regimental S2 and primarily communicated with the detachment headquarters through the regimental headquarters communications. The detachment headquarters maintained the same close coordination and reporting with the division G2. The divisional detachments did maintain informal liaison with the detachments of lateral units.<sup>13</sup>

The role of the divisional CIC was extremely important to the overall theater success in counterintelligence. The success enjoyed by the echelons above division was generally established by the initial counterintelligence work of the division. In this regard, a method to pass information and operations was necessary. A relay concept was used to provide continuous counterintelligence coverage throughout the theater starting with the division. As the division moved forward, the rear boundary would also be adjusted. As areas passed out of divisional control, the CIC detachment would turn over operations, informants, and prisoners to a corps-level CIC

detachment. To provide a smooth transition, one or two agents from the division would remain behind to transition operations, or corps agents would come forward to become familiar with the current situation. This action would be repeated with the army-level CIC detachments when the corps moved forward. The Army Group CIC detachments would transfer the records to the Communications Zone base section. The base section would be the final recipient of all operations behind the Army Group rear boundary. These detachments were generally static and became responsible for very large areas. The scope and type of threats and operations differed from the division, to Army Group and Communications Zone CIC detachments. The higher echelons had proportionally fewer personnel to provide coverage for an extended area.<sup>14</sup>

The relay system for counterintelligence coverage worked well in a static situation or when the front moved slowly. However, in fast paced movements along the front the system tended to break down because CIC elements had less time to execute a mission before moving out, adequate records were unable to be maintained, and the forward elements were not able to wait for follow-on (i.e., corps and army) elements to relieve them. As such, records were rarely transferred, and individuals detained by lead elements were passed back to follow on elements without adequate case histories. This caused countless

reinvestigations in order to dispose of the cases. Also, the relay system had a negative impact on the use of informants and working with local officials. Individuals were reluctant to be informants because of the rapid transfer between detachments. There was significant concern on the part of the informants that they would become known to the local population because of the frequent turn over in CIC personnel. Local officials were also weary of the frequent turn over because each detachment and echelon tended to have different policies for civilian population control.<sup>15</sup>

#### Corps

The primary mission of the Corps CIC detachments was to pick up counterintelligence operations from the divisions and act as a clean-up organization for the tasks left unfinished by the divisions. Ongoing investigations and targets bypassed by the divisional detachments were the principal operations performed at the corps level. Division established informant networks were expanded and integrated to extend coverage throughout the corps area.<sup>16</sup>

The limited time and assets available to the divisions prevented comprehensive coverage within the division sector. Generally, the CIC could cover only the highest priority targets, targets of opportunity, and provide support to the regiments. Overall, division CIC operations were narrowly focused to support immediate combat

and areas key surrounding areas. Because of the method of operations at the division level, the corps detachments would often pick up fragmented operations. The corps was responsible for completing the cases initiated by the divisions, and expanding coverage to the areas bypassed by the divisions.<sup>17</sup>

A more thorough investigation was possible at the corps level. Individuals detained or arrested usually had complete investigations conducted. Also, the population was more thoroughly screened to identify and arrest those individuals that met the automatic arrest criteria. The corps level generally operated a counterintelligence interrogation center. Individuals sent back from the divisions and others identified by corps assets were interrogated in depth, evaluated, exploited and disposed. Disposition could be by release or continued confinement in an Army Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) or civilian detention facility. Initial document collection and exploitation for counterintelligence purposes were performed at the corps level. The corps CIC detachments worked closely with Civil Censorship detachments, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogation facilities and MI interpreter teams.<sup>18</sup>

Compared to the division CIC detachments, the corps-level CIC detachments placed more emphasis on security controls for the civilian population. Although rudimentary controls were sometimes emplaced by divisions, the corps

level was the first echelon where comprehensive controls existed. Security controls were used to identify individuals and restrict movement. These controls were implemented by use of periodic road blocks, roving patrols and spot checks of identification documents. These methods accounted for a large number of captured enemy agents that either evaded forward security controls, or were placed in a particular area to be overrun by the Allies. Considerable time and effort was placed on screening individuals who applied for exemptions to the curfew or travel restrictions and prospective Military Government (MG) appointees.<sup>19</sup>

Counter Intelligence Corps was not the only asset used to establish the road blocks and conduct roving patrols. There were numerous instances where the CIC worked with combat forces, military police and the MG jointly. These control measures were emplaced by using troop units responsible for that particular area or the CIC detachment would randomly establish check points or conduct roving patrols.<sup>20</sup>

Although not true in all cases, the corps was normally the first level where organized searches of friendly headquarters was conducted. These searches were important anytime a headquarters moved, preventing enemy agents or sympathizers from searching the locations and obtaining useful information. Although always important, this was especially critical when the unit was withdrawing.

If the security controls and screening were effective, the possibility of enemy agents searching friendly areas after they were abandoned was greatly reduced.

The only forced rearward movement of friendly headquarters and units occurred during the German Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. During this offensive, the divisional CIC detachments in the Ardennes were extremely busy attempting to identify potential German soldiers in US uniforms infiltrating the lines or just trying to survive.

Most divisional CIC detachments in the Ardennes Region were involved in combat versus counterintelligence operations on 16 December 1944. In fact, the detachments in the path of the main German attacks were overrun much like the infantry. The 99th CIC Detachment, 99th ID was overrun early on the morning of 17 December. The eight individuals of the detachment were awakened early in the morning by the firing of burp guns. The Detachment Commander, Lieutenant (LT) Howard Stephens ordered the agents to defend the house they occupied. A German column of tanks was moving down the road next to the house. One of the tanks put the muzzle of its 88 millimeter gun in the window of the house and began to fire. The agents departed the house through the back door and attempted to escape. The group split into two groups of four. One group was able to escape while the other group, which included LT Stephens, was pinned down in a gun emplacement. After being attacked by small arms and

mortar fire, LT Stephens and one other agent were injured. The remaining two managed to escape and obtain help from elements of the 1st ID which was moving up to support the 99th ID. By the time the group returned for the two injured agents, LT Stephens and the other agent, Charles Sloan, were dead.<sup>21</sup>

As this example indicates, the divisional CIC detachments in the Ardennes area during the German offensive were not capable of performing any of their counterintelligence duties. The 99th CIC detachments did not establish anything that approached normal operations until the 99th ID and two of the three regiments were pushed back to the Elsenborn Ridge.<sup>22</sup>

The corps CIC detachments were generally composed of a standard type A2 and B2 from the TO&E 30-500. (See Tables 6 and 7) The detachments were authorized three commissioned officers and 11 enlisted personnel. It was not unusual for the detachments to be over strength, particularly by the end of 1944. The headquarters was positioned in the vicinity of the corps main command post and teams of agents were positioned throughout the corps sector to provide continuous coverage. Teams were positioned to weight coverage depending upon the corps mission and location of critical assets, major urban centers, or likely threat areas. These teams were also responsible for going forward to take over operations from the divisional CIC elements. Because of

limited personnel assets to support and cover the entire corps area, frequently CIC teams or detachments were sent down from the army level to reinforce corps operations.<sup>23</sup>

### Army

The mission of the army-level CIC detachments did not differ greatly from that of the division units. However, the focus at the army level shifted away from combat support to security for headquarters, communications, and logistical centers. The emphasis was not on the capture of enemy agents but protection of these critical installations. The army CIC assets were located 75 to 150 miles behind the frontline. The CIC assets were employed to conduct security surveys of major headquarters, communications centers and logistical bases behind the corps rear boundaries. The army-level counterintelligence effort also focused on assisting the MG. The bulk of the investigations conducted at this level were in support of the MG or individuals caught in security/travel control screening points.<sup>24</sup>

One mission that the army CIC assets routinely conducted was the establishment of a Counterintelligence Control Line (CCL). This was a line running across the corps or army sector, with check points established at road junctions, bridges, cafes, hotels, etc. for the purposes of identification.<sup>25</sup> A CCL was established by using Advance Section, Communications Zone CIC detachments along the German border once the Allied armies had pushed into

Germany. These detachments were formed and placed under the army's control to establish border control points.

The CCL was used to screen personnel moving forward or rearward across the border and had two primary purposes. The first was to screen individuals for travel authorization documents, identify suspected enemy agents, and German soldiers dressed in civilian clothing. Secondly, its purpose was to prevent "American auxiliary personnel such as Red Cross, War Correspondents and Technical Observers" from going forward of the CCL.<sup>26</sup> Several of these non-combatants had been captured by the enemy and German Intelligence had attempted to infiltrate US lines posing as these non-combatants. In the Third Army area, all civilian travel forward of the CCL was prohibited in January 1945.

The CCL concept also played an important role during the German Ardennes Offensive. For several months prior to the offensive, American intelligence was aware that the German Army had been recruiting soldiers that were fluent in English, physically fit, mentally alert and competent in close combat fighting.<sup>27</sup> These individuals were to form a two battalion brigade for reconnaissance, sabotage and espionage on the Western Front. Interrogation of EPW in November 1944 had indicated that all captured US Army equipment, weapons and clothing were to be evacuated to Onsabruleck, Germany.<sup>28</sup> This was the same area where the English speaking German soldiers were being transferred.

On the first day of the offensive, soldiers from the 106th ID found secret orders on the body of a German officer from the 116th Panzer Division. These orders outlined the deception plans (Operation Greif) that were an integral part of the German offensive. Before the end of the first day, details of the German plan to operate with two battalions of English speaking soldiers dressed and equipped with US material were sent out to all commands.<sup>29</sup>

Because of the previous low-level incidents of German soldiers attempting to cross the lines by using US uniforms, the CIC had undertaken an education campaign to alert troops to this fact and provide procedural checks to combat this action. Increased security consciousness and counterintelligence effort reduced the effectiveness of the German plan. In the Ninth Army area a poster campaign was used to educate troops in the corps rest areas.<sup>30</sup> The 29th ID took proactive measures to thwart the use of American uniforms.<sup>31</sup>

The CCL established in early December 1944 became an extremely important line of defense against the use of German soldiers in American uniforms operating behind the lines. The available CIC assets were mobilized to form a CCL east of the Meuse River. Identification documents were closely scrutinized at all bridges, defiles and critical road junctions throughout the American sector. The CCL east of the Meuse River placed control points at all roads which

led to bridges over the river. Screening of soldiers, refugees and displaced persons was implemented immediately. The 24-hour security posts were manned by CIC agents, Military Police and combat arms elements. Small interrogation centers were established near the bridges where questioning of all suspicious persons took place.<sup>32</sup> The CCL in the forward area of First Army had been broken by the German offensive, hence a coherent line was not possible. However, individual unit efforts allowed limited, and in some cases supporting networks, to be established on the sides of the German axis of advance.<sup>33</sup> The Third Army after action report stated that the CCL "represented the only existing cohesive means of preventing mass infiltration by enemy agents" during the Ardennes Offensive.<sup>34</sup>

#### Army Group

The mission of the Army Group CIC was primarily to provide security for the headquarters and logistical centers, and perform security advisory functions. Although the Army Group had the ability to perform all counterintelligence missions, there was little activity that required the execution of these missions.<sup>35</sup> Most of the action took place forward of the army boundary or in the Communications Zone areas (e.g., ports or major urban areas).

The monthly activity report for the 418th CIC Detachment, Twelfth Army Group indicated that the Army Group

CIC effort was principally oriented toward vital installations.<sup>36</sup> The Army Group had a total of 54 agents supporting the "Tactical Headquarters, Main Headquarters, Rear Headquarters, Interrogation Center and the T-Force Command Post."<sup>37</sup> The T-Force was an ad hoc organization developed in the ETO whereby various MI assets were combined into security patrols for other special missions. A T-Force team generally consisted of Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW), MI Interpreters and CIC personnel. These assets were generally used in counterintelligence roles and led by CIC personnel. The concept of using multi-disciplined MI teams was developed in the Italian theater, but called an S-Force.<sup>38</sup>

The remaining Army Group CIC assets were distributed and attached to the armies. (See Tables 6 and 7) Twelfth Army Group had six reserve CIC teams that were used to weight the main effort, provide additional coverage to major urban areas, or reinforce operations of the armies and/or corps. These reserve teams were used to bolster the CCL used during the German Ardennes Offensive.<sup>39</sup>

The Army Group consisted of standard type elements A3 and B3 from the TO&E. The reserve teams at the Army Group level were probably composed of A1/B1 or A2/B2 type organizations based on TO&E. Research did not positively identify the type of organization of the reserve teams. This conclusion was reached based on the number of locations

where these team were used, the number of individuals at each location, and the rank of individuals identified in the literature. The reserve teams could have been composed of five type A1/B1 teams, two A2/B2 and one A1/B1 teams or any combination of the above.<sup>40</sup>

### Evaluation

This section will analyze and evaluate the contributions and responsiveness of counterintelligence in the ETO. This will include an evaluation of the operational problems, and planning and contributions of the CIC. The factors to be reviewed include the changes in counterintelligence from pre World War II (WW II), the ability of counterintelligence to contribute to operations, the affect on campaign and tactical plans, effect on battlefield operations, use of counterintelligence by US commanders, and the effect of US counterintelligence on German intelligence operations in the ETO.

Significant changes were made in all areas of counterintelligence when compared with the pre-war period. Michael Howard, a noted historian and military theorist, stated in a speech on "Military Science in an Age of Peace" that military thought during times of peace was extremely important. It was important, not to get military theory on how to structure, train, and employ forces one hundred percent correct, but to get it close. The ability of an armed service to adapt and change its military thought and

theories to fit the actual operational environment of the next war is what will dictate success in war.<sup>41</sup> The ability of the US Army counterintelligence to adapt "to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown" is unquestioned.<sup>42</sup> Using Michael Howard's framework of getting doctrine close, and quickly adapting for evaluation criteria, US Army counterintelligence was a failure and success at the same time.

Counterintelligence in the US Army was a failure in WW II because it failed to be close on the vision for the next war. The US Army did develop plans for counterintelligence mobilization during the late 1930s and early 1940s.<sup>43</sup> However, there was little if any thought regarding how counterintelligence would support combat forces during wartime. The focus of thought at the War Department and the General Staff was on strategic employment of counterintelligence assets. In regard to counterintelligence doctrine, organization, training and equipment for employment in the ETO, the US Army did not get doctrine close. In fact, the argument can be made that the pre-WW II theories and doctrine were counter to the actual employment concepts used during WW II. The military thought and doctrine for counterintelligence was wrong primarily because counterintelligence as a discipline had not developed beyond a strategic support concept. Although, the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) conducted operations in

support of tactical units, the CIP was not part of those organizations. With only 50 sergeants in June 1940, the CIP focus before WW II was on strategic counterintelligence and basic survival of the discipline. As WW II approached, the CIP was limited in manpower. The idea of a massive army with detachments at virtually every level of the army was beyond anyone's wildest dreams. Counterintelligence missions and functions were basically unchanged from the pre-war period. However, the application and employment of counterintelligence assets differed drastically from those envisioned during the pre-WW II period.<sup>44</sup>

The CIP and its successor, the CIC did not have a written doctrine prior to 1943. Any doctrine that existed was passed on from individual to individual or by training provided to CIP special agents. Hence, the training for CIP and CIC personnel was not well grounded in theory or fundamental principles. In fact, during the period 1941 to 1943, training produced doctrine for the CIC. During this period, the CIC rapidly expanded in number of personnel as part of the military build up. Because there was no written doctrine, the doctrine was developed and contained in the lesson plans and instructions of the counterintelligence school. The training (doctrine) focused on strategic counterintelligence more closely aligned with criminal investigations. The major change in counterintelligence occurred in 1943. The two significant events that helped

transform US Army counterintelligence was the publication of Technical Manual 30-215 and the revision of the curriculum of the CIC school. The change was to make the course focus more on operations outside of the Continental United States (CONUS) with instruction on enemy intelligence services, troop security and civil population control. Also, rotating experienced personnel from overseas locations to the school as instructors went a long way in transforming the CIC into a viable and effective organization for the ETO.

The success of US Army Counterintelligence, using Michael Howard's framework, was definitely its ability to adapt. Counterintelligence made herculean efforts to grow and adapt to the changing requirements of wartime. The ability of the CIP and the CIC to adapt is all the more impressive knowing that the War Department was having to revise its vision of war and adapt to a new world at war concept.

The ability of the CIC to adapt and overcome adversity and problems is a tribute to the members of the Corps. The direction of a few key leaders and staff planners at the War Department General Staff (WDGS), and instructors at the various CIC schools were responsible for establishing the framework for success. However, the individual initiative of the special agents and officers in the ETO made the decisive contribution. For the most part, CIC personnel were shipped to the ETO without training

relating to what they actually needed to know, language training or a coherent doctrine. These same individuals applied the basic counterintelligence principles and set about to accomplish the mission the best way they could. For example, the CCL was not a doctrinal concept, but its employment proved extremely important. Without this initiative at the individual detachment level, the contribution of the CIC would have been much less significant and important. The outcome of the war, would not necessarily have been affected, but the ability of the forces in the ETO to counter enemy intelligence collection and stabilize the civil population would have been greatly reduced.

#### Operational Problems

The CIC, operating from the division to Army Group level in the ETO, enjoyed many successes, but also encountered many challenges and problems. The CIC detachments from division to army level suffered from a lack of sufficient personnel. The detachments under TO&E 30-500 did not have enough CIC personnel to execute the assigned missions, particularly knowing that the CIC units would be required to investigate hundreds of former enemy personnel would make the task even more difficult. Additionally, the size of the sectors, when taken in light of the campaign plan for the ETO (i.e., anticipated speed of advance),

demonstrated that the allocated assets were not capable of providing a sufficient level of support.<sup>45</sup>

At the individual detachment level, the CIC lacked administrative and clerical personnel. Because of the requirement for investigations and supporting documentation, a large portion of time and effort was consumed on administrative duties.<sup>46</sup> This reduced the time available for CIC personnel to perform their primary missions. Increased clerical support would have improved the record keeping and made the transition between CIC echelons easier. This is particularly true in a rapidly moving and changing front.

The CIC detachments also lacked sufficient linguists to adequately perform their duties. Because the CIC did not have sufficient special agents and agents trained as linguists, interpreters were used to augment CIC linguists in performance of the mission. The lack of linguists, whether CIC or not, generally presented a limitation on operations and investigations. The use of interpreters, both US and local nationals partially filled the void. However, the ability to have language qualified CIC personnel greatly enhanced the speed and quality of investigations. The ability to listen and understand a suspect's response, opposed to delay experienced by using an interpreter, greatly added to the investigator's ability to break down an enemy agent's story for his/her activities.

Working through interpreters caused important information and speech elements to be lost in the translation.<sup>47</sup>

The use of the relay system proved effective, but numerous problems were encountered in a rapidly moving front. The principal problems were experienced at the division and corps level. Much of the counterintelligence effort during the movement across France in the summer and early fall of 1944, and the rapid movement across Germany in the early spring of 1945, was hastily done. There was generally a lag period between the time the division would move forward and the corps assets arrived to assume control of a sector. This situation did not always allow face-to-face transition. Records and investigations were frequently lost or misplaced.<sup>48</sup> Individuals detained and placed in EPW or civilian detention centers sometimes were held without supporting documentation. This caused many man-hours to be wasted to reinvestigate and attempt to clear cases as the leads and evidence slipped away.

Because of the structure and practices of the CIC and its predecessor, the CIP, the mission and functions of US Army counterintelligence were not well known by the commanders. This was particularly true at the levels below corps. At times, detachments were misused because commanders did not understand the mission and function of the CIC. There are numerous examples that some commanders used their counterintelligence assets for other purposes

with full knowledge of their actions. Although this was a commander's prerogative, it was explicitly against War Department and SHAEF policy.<sup>49</sup> This was generally overcome through education of the commanders and the support the CIC gave to them as the operations in Europe progressed.

Important points regarding the general knowledge of the CIC dealt with quickly directing suspects to the CIC detachments, requesting assistance, and security education for soldiers. If the CIC was relatively unknown to most soldiers, the effectiveness of their counterespionage and security education programs would also be degraded.

There were incidents of confusion and lack of coordination between the CIC and military government personnel. The relationship was generally good at division level where the military government (civil affairs) depended heavily on the CIC to help implement MG policies. However, in a rapidly moving front or at higher levels, there was sometimes conflict between the public safety policies of the MG and the civilian security controls used by the CIC. This is not to imply that the CIC and the MG were always at odds. The CIC was greatly assisted by, and complemented the MG by the use of security controls on the civilian population, collection of weapons from civilians, and investigation of prospective local national MG appointees. There were conflicts that originated from the same policy from higher headquarters. Because of the arrest and detention of

individuals by the CIC, MG programs were hampered. Also the MG policy of not dislocating captured enemy documents conflicted with the CIC requirement to quickly exploit and evacuate these same documents.<sup>50</sup> For the most part, problems between the two organizations were resolved at the lowest levels by reasonable compromise. However, in some cases these problems were caused due to incomplete or lack of staff work at higher echelons.

There were also deficiencies in the equipment provided to the detachments by TO&E 30-500. Comments from the detachments indicated that the fingerprint equipment, and listening and recording devices were of little use. However, the revolvers, handcuffs and cameras were indispensable items. Detachments requested that additional items of equipment be authorized beyond the items in TO&E 30-500. Some of the additional requested items were small generators, field phones, tactical radios, stoves, portable typewriters (in lieu of standard issue) and additional vehicles. The vehicles included armored cars for detachments in armored divisions, and additional cargo vehicles for all detachments.<sup>51</sup>

There were also problems in the use of funds for informants. Confidential funds were available to CIC detachments for informant payments and other intelligence purposes. Funds were allotted to the G2 and provided to the detachments using a voucher system.<sup>52</sup> The accountability

and use of funds was the responsibility of the G2 and the detachment commander. The idea of providing payment for informants was fairly well established in the US Army by WW II. Experience of the CIC detachments in the ETO indicated that currency was not necessarily the best method. The most effective incentives and methods of payment to informants were in the forms of commodities. Cigarettes, gasoline, food, candy, and even soap were particularly effective inside of Germany. However, efforts to use these items in lieu of currency generally failed because the Army system was not prepared, or willing, to change procedures to accommodate operations. The resource management system was set up to dispense and account for currency, but could not switch to other forms of payment that were more effective in the field.<sup>53</sup>

#### Operational Planning and Contributions

It is very clear from a review of the campaign plans and various operations plans at the SHAEF and Army Group level that counterintelligence was very much integrated into the overall planning effort. The plans for Operation Overlord and operations on the European continent were contained in a 53-page counterintelligence directive issued in February 1944. Additional sections were added through 22 July 1944, to complete the planning process for operations on the continent.<sup>54</sup>

A review of counterintelligence operations from 6 June to 6 August 1944, was conducted to identify and resolve problems for future operations. The fact that a review took place indicates a desire to refine and improve the value of counterintelligence and its contribution to the operations.<sup>55</sup>

The 12th Army Group published what amounted to a campaign plan for counterintelligence operations in Germany. The Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany stated that "with the advance of our forces into Germany, counterintelligence, especially the security aspect thereof, has become increasingly vital."<sup>56</sup> The ultimate object of the counterintelligence effort under this plan was the destruction of "every vestige of the enemy secret intelligence services, security and secret police and para-military organizations."<sup>57</sup> This directive detailed plans that covered all aspects of the counterintelligence operations, administration, reporting, coordination and liaison. The fact that the directive was produced indicates the level of importance counterintelligence played in the ETO. Counterintelligence was not a decisive factor in the victory in Europe, but security for the force and destruction of the enemy intelligence and underground organizations were essential. It was imperative not necessarily to "win the war," but to achieve peace and stability after the fighting stopped. In this regard,

counterintelligence and the CIC were extremely important to the war effort.

From the operational level, the affect of the CIC on operations within the ETO was significant. This is not to imply that counterintelligence and the CIC made a decisive contribution to the war effort. It most clearly was only a combat support function, but one that was given much attention, discussion and planning prior to Operation Overlord. This is also true even to a greater extent during the planning and preparation for the invasion of Germany proper and the occupation of that nation.

Counterintelligence operations were integrated into the plans and operations at the theater (communications zone), army group, army and corps level. The Headquarters, Forward Echelon Communications Zone, ETO produced a very detailed plan as an annex to the Communications Plan.<sup>58</sup> Had the CIC not been deployed to the ETO, the counterintelligence mission would have been performed by some other organization.

During the one major crisis (Ardennes) that occurred during Allied operations on the European continent, the leadership from the 12th Army Group down to corps level used counterintelligence and the CIC as a countermeasure against the German Army. The pairing of CIC assets with combat troops to create a defensive line (CCL) to prevent the infiltration or penetration of German soldiers masquerading

as US soldiers indicates the faith that seniors leaders at the corps to theater level had in the CIC.

The extent of effect US Army counterintelligence had on the German Intelligence Service (GIS) is difficult to determine. There are indications and some documented cases that prove that counterintelligence did have an effect on the GIS. German Intelligence Service agents were generally one of two types. The first type was the stay behind agent. These agents were trained to operate behind Allied lines for very long periods of time. These individuals were generally placed in an area by the GIS and overrun by the Allies when the Germans withdrew. The agents usually were equipped with a short wave radio for communications with their controllers at the GIS.<sup>59</sup> The other type of agent generally encountered was the line crosser. These agents were trained and dispatched by their controller to collect information and return to German lines with the information. There were many different types of line crossers used by the GIS. These ranged from civilians to German soldiers. There was great disparity in the quality and training received by these agents. They ranged from individuals arrested by the Germans for black market activities to not having official papers. These individuals were generally given the option of cooperating with the GIS or going to a concentration camp. These individuals were given little training and dispatched quickly across the line. There was another group

of agents that fell into the line crosser category that were provided extensive training, preparation, and planning. Included in this group of agents were the soldiers trained and dispatched into American lines during the Ardennes Offensive.<sup>60</sup>

The CIC enjoyed good success against the line crosser agents. The interrogation of three GIS agents indicated that agent operations were directly tied to counterintelligence efforts in the US Army. Infiltration of American lines during the fall of 1944 was directed to the Third Army sector for agents targeted against the interior of France. It became apparent to the GIS that the checks and control in the Third Army sector were not as stringently enforced as in other sectors.<sup>61</sup> By the time of the Ardennes Offensive, Third Army's counterintelligence controls had greatly improved. The portion of the Third Army After Action Report concerned with this offensive stated that the CCL was an extremely important means to prevent enemy agent infiltration.<sup>62</sup> The Third Army counterintelligence effort not only became very effective against the GIS, but also the US intelligence efforts. By January 1945, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reported that every OSS agent that attempted to infiltrate enemy lines in the Third Army sector was "captured and escorted back for identification" because of the effective controls in the sector.<sup>63</sup>

Counterintelligence was also successful in assembling pieces of information that indicated that the Germans were preparing for offensive action using German soldiers in US uniforms with American equipment. With the discovery of the German plan on the first day of the Ardennes Offensive, counterintelligence efforts succeeded in identifying and capturing numerous members of the 150th Panzer Brigade. This unit was the organization that had been trained, equipped and directed to operate behind Allied lines to secure bridges over the Meuse River, and cause confusion and disruption behind Allied lines. This unit was composed of jeep teams and armored units. The jeep teams were the reconnaissance elements to be targeted and followed up by armored units to exploit gaps. The armored units used American armor or other German vehicles altered to resembled American vehicles. On 18 December 1944, the first Germans masquerading as American soldiers were captured. By the eighth day of the offensive, the effect of the German infiltration efforts had been mitigated by the counterintelligence effort. The Germans, however, were able to create considerable confusion within the American Army, but the contribution to the offensive was more psychological than anything else. The leader of the deception effort was Colonel Otto Skorzeny. His headquarters was responsible for the deceptive reconnaissance, infiltration and commando raids during the Ardennes Offensive.<sup>64</sup> Upon Colonel

Skorzeny's capture at the end of WW II, he stated that there were only two to four successful missions during the offensive.<sup>65</sup> The German deception attempts generally failed because of the road blocks and roving patrols used to identify infiltrating units.<sup>66</sup>

As a generalization, the line crossers, whether civilian or military agents, were of limited success. The GIS appeared to adapt their operations to the US counterintelligence effort. For instance, because line crosser agents achieved a low mission success rate, the GIS attempted to use quantity over quality in order to acquire their intelligence information. This does not mean that the GIS did not take the time and effort to train line crossers, but the American effort to counter the GIS intelligence collection effort was more successful than the German efforts to collect intelligence information.

The CIC had made great strides since the military mobilization for WW II began in 1940. The changes in doctrine, organization, training, and structure had a profound affect on the operations of the CIC in the ETO. The decision to place CIC assets at all tactical headquarters having a general staff paid large dividends for the commanders and soldiers in the ETO. The operations executed by the CIC proved once again, that having a doctrine is important. Once a coherent doctrine and a training program focused on combat operations were

developed, the value of the counterintelligence support provided to commanders at operational and tactical levels was significantly increased. The CIC in the ETO also showed initiative by the development and use of concepts not covered in doctrine that had an important impact on operations. The CCL and integration of other MI assets into counterintelligence operations are examples. Finally, having high quality soldiers who were willing to exercise initiative when combined with the above factors was what allowed the CIC to enjoy great success in the ETO.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Summary

The organized counterintelligence effort in the US Army began with the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) in 1917. Counterintelligence in the US Army survived an extremely turbulent period from the end of World War I (WW I) until early 1940. The CIP operated for 26 years after its creation without a formal doctrine, structure, training program or standard set of equipment. The rapid expansion of the CIP, renamed the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), saw thousands of individuals deploy to numerous theaters of operations around the world. This made a sound doctrine, structure and training program an absolute necessity. These items were not actually developed until 1943 and occurred almost too late to have a significant effect on World War II (WW II).<sup>2</sup>

The mission of the CIC remained the same as its predecessor the CIP. However, the employment of the CIC in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) differed greatly from the previous employment of the CIP. The decision to place CIC assets in combat units from division through theater was the most significant and far reaching decision

of the war for US Army counterintelligence. This decision brought counterintelligence from a relatively detached status to full integration in the US Army. All areas of counterintelligence were affected by this action. The focus of counterintelligence was changed from purely strategic to the support of strategic through tactical operations. This required a completely different doctrine, set of operational methods, training programs and equipment requirements to support the operational and tactical levels. Methods and procedures to support frontier control, refugee screening, document exploitation, etc. were now required. The concept of individual special agents operating autonomously in civilian clothes could no longer be the standard. The individual special agent now needed to operate as part of a team in a tactical environment. This required special agents to conduct investigations in uniform and be physically fit to survive in the field. The CIC detachments required guidance regarding the conduct and management of operations, central registration of informants, and rapid intelligence reporting methods. With all the changes that occurred, the basic mission was the only item that remained the same between the CIP of 1940 and the CIC of 1944.

The employment of CIC assets in the ETO also allowed the integration of counterintelligence with other intelligence assets to give the senior intelligence officers and commanders a comprehensive intelligence picture. The "T

Forces" integrated individuals who were trained as interpreters, interrogators, and counterintelligence specialists.<sup>3</sup> Counterintelligence and combat soldiers were also integrated to prevent the flow of enemy agents into US sectors by using the Counterintelligence Control Line (CCL). The CCL proved to be extremely valuable and one of the few effective defenses against the use of German soldiers operating behind friendly lines during the Ardennes Offensive.

Although the counterintelligence effort in the ETO during WW II was a success story, there were many problem areas. The relay system usually broke down during rapid movement causing significant problems in the transfer of operations between echelons. Coordination and operations with the Military Government were at times confusing and conflicting. There was also a shortage of CIC qualified linguists which limited the capabilities and contributions of the CIC in the ETO.

After action reports from the ETO indicate that the interrogation of enemy prisoners was the one intelligence function that produced the most reliable intelligence for commanders.<sup>4</sup> Counterintelligence was not the most important or the major producer of critical intelligence for the ETO. However, it is clear that the missions and functions of counterintelligence were necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war in Europe. If the CIC had not

existed, some other organization or resources would have been diverted to perform the missions of the CIC.

### Conclusions

The following are the significant conclusions drawn from the study regarding how US Army counterintelligence units were organized, trained, and equipped to support operations in the ETO during WW II. The decision to place CIC assets at the operational and tactical levels required a massive expansion of the CIC. Since there was not a doctrine at the time, one had to be developed that supported all levels of operation. The CIC contributions were reactive and not totally integrated with combat operations until the CIC doctrine was developed. Wartime experience gained from early operations and an extensive after action review process allowed doctrine to be developed that adequately supported operations in the ETO. The fact that it took two years to develop the doctrine limited the effectiveness of the CIC early in the war. The organization, structure, training, and equipment for the CIC depended upon the doctrine. Although these areas had to be developed in advance of doctrine to field units, the CIC did not become a truly effective organization until the doctrine was developed. When this was accomplished, the other areas were adjusted to fit the doctrine and the CIC became proactive and a much more effective organization. The

development of the CIC doctrine was key to the success enjoyed by counterintelligence during WW II.

Counterintelligence in the US Army underwent dramatic changes in all areas between 1941 and 1943. The doctrine, organization, size, training, and equipment used by the CIC was drastically different from its predecessor the CIP. The doctrine developed in 1942 and 1943 was a reaction to, rather than a thoughtful consideration of, the situation that existed in the 1940s. Also, training was focused on criminal investigation and not on the application of investigative techniques for intelligence purposes. Training developed and produced doctrine for the CIC in 1942 and 1943.

Counterintelligence was extremely reactive in nature during the first two years of the war. The lack of serious planning by the War Department prior to 1941 significantly degraded the ability of counterintelligence as a discipline to contribute to the war effort. This is not to imply that the CIP and CIC did not make major contributions before 1944. Nothing could be further from the fact. However, the expansion of counterintelligence occurred in a haphazard manner because there was no plan for the rapid expansion of counterintelligence. It is very clear that training in 1942 and 1943 produced doctrine and not the other way around. The effectiveness of counterintelligence would have been greatly improved if the doctrinal publications and the

direction for counterintelligence (i.e., placement at tactical levels) been decided before the war started.

The CIC did become proactive once deployed to the ETO. The experience gained by wartime operations was key to the changes made in the CIC. The affect of the formal lessons learned reports and assignment of CIC personnel with recent overseas experience to CIC training slots, had a significant effect on the doctrinal, organizational and training changes made in 1943. These changes built upon the in-theater experience and expanded the ETO capabilities by assigning CIC detachments that were organized, trained and prepared to execute the new doctrine. However, this is not to infer that all problems were fixed. Yet, once a standard doctrine, organization and training base was established, the CIC in the ETO became much more effective. These changes coupled with the initiative of the CIC soldiers, tipped the balance from a reactive to a proactive counterintelligence effort in the ETO.

The CIC units that operated on the European continent were structured and organized in accordance with the doctrinal publications (i.e., Technical Manual (TM) 30-215 and Table of Organization & Equipment (TO&E) 30-500) that existed at the time. These doctrinal publications did not exist prior to the middle of 1943, which had a serious impact on the effectiveness of the CIC during WW II. The CIC did not truly become a proficient organization until the

war was almost over. This was the point where the effects of changes in doctrine, structure, and training eventually came together to impact operations in the ETO.

The organization of the CIC detachments lacked adequate clerical personnel and linguist-qualified CIC special agents. The lack of personnel to perform administrative actions caused CIC personnel to be diverted from missions to perform these important, but mundane tasks. The lack of qualified linguists in French and German was a significant constraint on operations for the CIC. The lack of linguists restricted the ability of individuals to conduct some operations, degraded the effectiveness of other operations and generally slowed the counterintelligence process overall.

Prior to the beginning of WW II, there were no counterintelligence organizations at the operational or tactical levels in the US Army. Individual special agents of the CIP were detailed to the operational commands to provide counterintelligence support. It was not until 1942 that previously organized counterintelligence units were placed with operational commands.<sup>5</sup>

How effective the CIC was in countering German intelligence can not be determined with any quantifiable answer. However, it is quite clear that the German intelligence effort responded to the US Army counterintelligence efforts. The German Intelligence

Service changed its modus operandi in an attempt to minimize the impact of US counterintelligence in the ETO and further altered the training, equipping and procedures for insertion of enemy agents into allied controlled areas.

The following conclusions are not directly tied to the primary or secondary research questions of this thesis, but warrant discussion. The War Department General Staff (WDGS) attempted to control and direct the daily operations of an ever expanding CIC during the initial stages of WW II. It was not until recommendations made by the Inspector General were implemented in 1943 that counterintelligence began to flourish.<sup>6</sup> The report indicated the Army staff should develop policy, work intelligence issues and handle procurement actions unique to counterintelligence. Responsibility for the execution of missions should remain with a commander. The old Army saying that "staffs plan and commanders execute" certainly was true in this case.

The CIC did not have an officer corps procured, trained, and developed to lead counterintelligence soldiers. This was a significant shortfall that impacted on its ability to provide leadership at the proper levels with the proper experience to plan, defend, and supervise its actions. There were experienced counterintelligence officers assigned to the WDGS, but there were too few to have a decisive affect on the CIC once the expansion began. A trained and dedicated officer corps would have allowed the

CIC to become a much more effective organization earlier in its development.

The decentralization of CIC training to the Service Commands in 1942 reduced the training proficiency of the CIC. This change was most likely the single decision responsible for the untrained status of CIC personnel in the ETO documented in the lessons learned reports. The CIC detachments supporting the Service Commands were now responsible for the training of CIC personnel.<sup>7</sup> This made enforcement of training standards virtually impossible because the training was being conducted by approximately ten different detachments. Individuals in these detachments were, for the most part, recent graduates of counterintelligence training. These detachments were also responsible for executing their operational missions as well as for training new agents. This decision had a far reaching impact regarding the preparation of CIC personnel to execute their mission in the ETO. Even when the Staging Base training concept was instituted to better train deploying CIC detachments, the officers of the detachment in training were designated as instructors for the course. This created a situation where untrained individuals were providing the training. This partially negated the concept and value of the Staging Base which was the original solution to the training problems for personnel deploying to the ETO.

One of the most effective training tools was the lessons learned report distributed throughout the ETO by the CIC. This was particularly true for those detachments waiting for Operation Overlord to be executed. The best teacher is experience, but if experience is not available, the second best teacher is reading about the experience of others. These reports had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the CIC and the ability of the organization to adapt quickly to changing situations. These reports provided information regarding what methods and procedures were effective and just as important, which ones were ineffective. These reports allowed units to tailor training and procedures for operations before being committed to the combat zone. Lessons learned reports continued to be important even after units were committed to the combat zone. The ability to learn from other detachments' successes and failures greatly assisted operations. This was especially true during operations in Germany where methods used in liberated France did not necessarily work for dealing with German nationals on German soil. These reports also greatly assisted in the formulation and development of the CIC doctrine prior to 1943.

The reinforcing nature of the CIC in the ETO was absolutely critical to the success enjoyed by the CIC. The relay system, although not perfect, allowed an effective counterintelligence effort throughout the theater. The

ability of the commander at the corps, army, and army group to influence counterintelligence operations significantly increased the success of the CIC. Counterintelligence assets were used to support a corps or army main effort, a particular operation or geographical area, or dedicate all assets to one particular counterintelligence function (e.g., the CCL). The assets located at corps and higher were frequently used to reinforce selected divisions or corps due to operational requirements (e.g., number of refugees), level of enemy activity, location of major cities or international borders. The fact that each army group had reserve teams that were used to weight operations or action indicates the importance and reinforcing nature of counterintelligence in the ETO. The relay system was not a US Army doctrinal concept, but an initiation by the theater CIC that proved extremely important for success in Europe.

#### Implications for the Future

The current AirLand Battle doctrine contained in Field Manual 100-5, Operations describes the generation of combat power at the operational and tactical levels. This combat power is generated by taking the initiative and aggressively executing the mission. To achieve success, ground forces must "throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction."<sup>8</sup> The requirement for a viable counterintelligence force could not get a better foundation for a mission statement as the US

Army enters a new and potentially more challenging century. In order to succeed in combat, the enemy must be surprised. This must be accomplished by a comprehensive deception plan and an effective counterintelligence organization to prevent enemy intelligence collection.

As the US Army undergoes a significant draw down of military forces and prepares to enter the 21st century, the study of events 50 years ago has greater significance for the US Army. The requirement to counter potential enemy collection efforts against the US Army today is probably greater than at any time in our history. This is particularly true if the US Army hopes to surprise the enemy with a powerful blow before the enemy strikes first. The need to protect the force extends from the strategic level to the tactical battlefield. Technology has provided new weapon systems, enhanced communication capabilities, and has added more sophisticated intelligence collection systems to the battlefield that was unthinkable in 1944. The ability of potential enemies to track deployment, movement, and disposition of ground formations by satellite and airborne reconnaissance is a significant threat. This places a greater burden on the security and protection of ground forces so they can reach and survive on the battlefield. The lethality of stealth aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and highly effective antitank weapons has increased the requirement to counter

enemy intelligence collection and target acquisition systems. The use of a multiecheloned intelligence effort which incorporates and plans for the use of counterintelligence assets to deny enemy collection is a necessity.

The counterintelligence effort of the future will need to be a multidisciplined effort capable of countering enemy imagery, signals and human intelligence collection efforts. The need for a robust multiecheloned counterintelligence capability which is fully integrated with the overall intelligence effort of the future is clear.

The rapid movement experienced by the Allied Armies attacking across France in 1944 presented the CIC with numerous problems. These problems still exist in today's Army with a doctrine of highly mobile warfare. The CIC in the ETO used the relay system to support this mobile warfare. This system provided procedures to turn over operations and areas and linked the echelons together. This fostered the principle of reinforcing lower echelons. The ability to quickly report intelligence information and turn over operations and areas to follow-on forces is still a particular weakness in the counterintelligence discipline. Personal experience gained during Operations Desert Shield and Storm, and the subsequent counterintelligence operations in Kuwait indicated that not much progress has been made since WW II. Current counterintelligence doctrine does not

address the function or tasks associated with passing operations to another echelon. With the war fighting doctrine of mobile warfare and rapid movement of large formations, this function requires additional consideration.

This factor becomes increasingly important and more difficult in the joint operations arena. Military operations in the future will almost always be joint in nature. This requires that a solid doctrinal base be established among the services prior to the execution of operations. The development of a coherent joint doctrine should not suffer the same fate as the US Army counterintelligence doctrine in WW II (i.e., developed in the middle of the campaign). Joint doctrine must be developed now so counterintelligence units can train and practice joint operations before the next combat operation. The real possibility exists that ground forces may be deployed to a theater where the counterintelligence support will be provided by the US Navy or US Marine Corps. Unless a joint doctrine is developed that identifies the missions and unique support requirements of the various services, critical vulnerabilities could be exploited by the enemy with disastrous effects. A joint counterintelligence doctrine would also make transition of operations between services easier.

The attachment and use of counterintelligence assets at the division level proved extremely valuable in the ETO.

In fact, the success of follow-on echelons was established by the divisional CIC detachments.<sup>9</sup> The US Army needs to retain and increase the counterintelligence capability at the division and corps levels. These assets are required to counter human intelligence collection just like the CIC did 50 years ago. However, the modern day counterintelligence effort must also help counter enemy intelligence collection by imagery and signals intelligence systems. The placement of counterintelligence assets at the division and corps levels also significantly assists the integration of these capabilities and assets with combat forces to produce a combat multiplier. The CIC was particularly effective when they were integrated with combat forces. The CCL east of the Meuse River and the integration of CIC personnel in regimental combat teams are prime examples of integration.

Current counterintelligence doctrine prescribes missions and functions for screening military and civilian personnel. This screening is accomplished by mobile and static checkpoints much like those used by the CIC in the ETO. However, the doctrine does not suggest or even discuss the need or possibility of an extended system of checkpoints across a corps or joint operations area. The use of the CCL should be considered for inclusion in counterintelligence doctrine. It should not be included because it is different from the checkpoints in the current doctrine, but because of

the staff planning and coordination it requires across echelons and services to execute such an operation.

The CIC experienced a severe shortage of linguists which was a limitation on operations in the ETO. This problem has not been solved, and perhaps is more serious today than in WW II. The US Army had a similar linguist shortage during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The US Army lacked sufficient Arabic linguists to perform the mission during this crisis. Kuwaiti students studying in the United States volunteered for service to help reduce the linguist shortage. These individuals were used as translators to support the signals intelligence, interrogation, and counterintelligence missions. Without these individuals, the intelligence support would have been extremely limited and inflexible.

As the US military strategy changes from forward presence to power projection, the ability to quickly deploy intelligence support packages with sufficient linguists to accomplish the mission will become increasingly important. The next operation may not allow six months to recruit, train and deploy linguists to support the mission. This is a significant shortfall facing the intelligence community in general and the counterintelligence field in specific. The ability to quickly identify and deploy linguists from the active, reserve and national guard is essential to success in the future.

The CIC was not a well-known organization in the ETO. Many senior officers did not know that the CIC existed. Those that did know, did not always use the CIC to its fullest potential. To a large extent, the CIC effort depended upon strong leadership at the CIC detachment level. This problem was partially overcome by educating commanders and key officers on the CIC mission and capabilities. Where commanders and staff officers understood the mission and capabilities of the CIC, these assets were used in a proactive manner to support operations. This is when the CIC made its greatest contributions. The counterintelligence effort in the US Army today suffers from the same problems as in the 1940s. Often, counterintelligence agents are thought of as the individuals who find security violations, check noise and light discipline, and wear civilian clothes. Obviously, the counterintelligence mission is much broader, but still misunderstood.

As suggested above, counterintelligence must be integrated into all levels of operations and be used as a force multiplier. The orientation of counterintelligence support must look to the future, and be focused on the enemy collection capabilities. Counterintelligence must support information security for the US Army, but this should not be the exclusive mission. In order to shift mission emphasis, commanders and key leaders must understand the mission and

capabilities of counterintelligence. This also includes the limitations regarding what counterintelligence can do, both operationally and legally. This will greatly assist in the full integration of counterintelligence into operations plans and allow all counterintelligence capabilities to be fully exploited.

The CIC experienced some equipment shortages and was issued equipment that was not needed for operations in the ETO. The only significant shortfall in equipment that was raised consistently in the lessons learned reports from WW II was mobility. There was a need then, and it still exists now, to have the counterintelligence assets supporting tactical operations as mobile as the force it supports.

This does not mean that counterintelligence in heavy divisions should be issued M1s or M2s. However, counterintelligence units must have transportation that will keep pace with the maneuver forces if it is to properly execute its mission. Also, there must be sufficient transportation assets available to move counterintelligence personnel throughout the battlefield, or concentrate them in one area at the critical time, depending upon missions requirements.

Finally, the advent of technology has presented many benefits and challenges for counterintelligence. There is a need to standardize computer systems, programs and data requirements across the US Army and sister services. A

modern day special agent is equipped with little more than tactical gear, a weapon and a desk top computer. The computer allows large amounts of information to be processed and transmitted; however, very small and seemingly insignificant factors seriously degrade the value of the computer. An incompatible program used to process data, the method in which the data is stored, or lack of standard report formats can render the data useless to other individuals or counterintelligence units unless standards are established. From personal experience during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, counterintelligence information could not be passed between echelons (corps to theater) and between services (US Marine Corps to the US Army) because of these factors. Fifty years have passed since WW II, but US Army counterintelligence is experiencing the same problems experienced by the CIC in the ETO. A joint, or at minimum, an Army standard for program and data requirements would go a long way in resolving this problem and greatly assist the transfer of operations and areas discussed above.

#### Recommendations for Future Study

Based on the research and analysis conducted for this thesis, recommend further studies be undertaken of CIC operations. A comprehensive study of the operations of the CIC in WW II (all or selected theaters) should be compared with the present day doctrinal operations of the US Army.

This thesis has found several concepts employed in the ETO that were not doctrine, but could prove to be very useful for current counterintelligence operations. This study could provide useful input for the future roles and missions of counterintelligence into the 21st century.

Another study should be conducted to determine whether sufficient counterintelligence assets have been allocated to the US Army operational and tactical level commands under the AirLand Battle doctrine. As part of this study, the implications for training and methods to transfer operations on a highly mobile and rapidly changing battlefield should be explored.

Finally, a study should be conducted to determine if counterintelligence assets should be assigned to combat arms brigades. Divisional CIC assets in the ETO were frequently attached to, or directly supported regimental combat team operations. Current US doctrine and practices attach or place counterintelligence assets under the operational control of maneuver brigades. As the US Army restructures, counterintelligence assets assigned at the brigade level could better support the tactical commander, while simultaneously providing for the rapid execution of counterintelligence operations.

The CIC of WW II did not have a doctrine when WW II began. A doctrine was developed based upon experience and the CIC adapted quickly to changing situations. This

allowed the CIC to make significant contributions to the war effort in the ETO. Counterintelligence of the future must be prepared to execute diverse missions anywhere in the world with little notice. To successfully meet the challenges of the future, counterintelligence must have a coherent doctrine that is joint and flexible to meet future requirements. As Michael Howard has observed, doctrine developed during peacetime does not need to meet 100 percent of the wartime requirements. However, doctrine must be close and be able to rapidly change to meet wartime requirements.

The CIC doctrine of WW II took two years to develop and another year to be integrated throughout the ETO. Counterintelligence of the future will not have the luxury of time to develop doctrine based upon experience. Doctrine must be developed from a critical analysis of the past and a vision of the future. The US Army counterintelligence effort will not have years or months to adapt doctrine, but days or hours. It is imperative that a strong counterintelligence capability be retained in the US Army, and it be based on a thoughtful doctrine with a feedback system to allow rapid changes to adapt to wartime requirements. This will ensure that counterintelligence of the future continues to make significant contributions to the US Army started by the CIP in 1917 and continued by the CIC in the ETO during WW II.

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## Chapter 5

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TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR  
CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE IN 1920

<u>Location</u>	<u>Authorizations</u>
1st Corps Area	2
2d Corps Area	4
3d Corps Area	2
4th Corps	2
5th Corps Area	2
6th Corps Area	4
7th Corps Area	2
8th Corps Area	7
9th Corps Area	5
Philippine Department	5
Hawaiian Department	3
Panama Department	2
Washington, DC (MID)	5
Total	45

Source: Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986), 371.

TABLE 2  
CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE  
AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND STRENGTH IN 1941

<u>Corps Areas</u>			<u>Departments and Other</u>		
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
First	22	15	Alaska	6	2
Second	40	40	Hawaii	19	13
Third	52	36	Philippines	32	19
Fourth	41	34	Panama	16	15
Fifth	24	22	Islands	9	0
Sixth	29	17	Trinidad	8	1
Seventh	22	20	Iceland	12	0
Eight	35	31	MID	25	28
Ninth	44	29	Reserve	50	0
Total Authorized = 513 [486]*					
Total On Hand = 338 [322]*					

Source: US Army, History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Volume IV, The Counter Intelligence Corps Between Two World Wars: 1918-1941 (Fort Holabird: Department of the Army, 1960), 103.

\*Table 2 is verbatim replicate of the original source document. However, the authorization and on hand quantities do not equal the figures listed in the Total Authorizations and On Hand figures for the table. The total authorizations of 513 individuals for the CIC in 1941 was used in numerous other references, so that figure was used in thesis instead of 486 that is the sum of the two columns above.

TABLE 3

CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE  
INVESTIGATORS TRAINING SCHOOL CURRICULUM

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Enrollment and Welcome Ceremonies	2
<u>Investigation Course</u>	
General Principles of Investigative Procedures	4
Observation and Description	2 Lecture 8 Practical
Modus Operandi-Arsonist	1
Modus Operandi-Burglars	1
Alien Registration Laws and Alien Investigations	2
Bombs and Infernal Machines	2
Sabotage and Saboteurs	2
Espionage and Counterespionage	5
Labor Organization Affecting National Defense	2
Plant Protection	2
Applicant and Charge Investigation	2
Methods of Surveillance	3 Lecture 8 Practical
Undercover Work	3 Lecture 8 Practical
Informers	2
Interrogation of Persons	2

Source: Covert Warfare Volume VI, Section 2, Training of CIC Personnel: The History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, introduction by John Mendelsohn (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 40-49.

Moulage*	2
Fingerprinting	2
Latent Fingerprinting	3
System of Identification	1
Codes and Ciphers	1
Handwriting Comparison	2
Documentary Corroboration	2
Photography	1
Methods of Searching	4
Preserving Evidence	1
Dictaphones and Induction Coils	2
Scientific Aids to an Investigator	6

Law Course

Civics	2
Law of Arrest	2
Law of Search and Seizure	2
Evidence	2
Confessions and Statements	1
Conspiracy	2
Laws-Espionage, Sabotage and Treason	2
Articles of War and Military Law	2
Functions of United States Attorney's Office	1
Federal Court Procedure	1
Visit to Local Courts	3

\*Moulage is the process of making molds for identification purposes.

<b>State Court Procedure</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Court Martial Procedures</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Testifying in Court</b>	<b>2</b>

**General Course**

<b>Report Writing</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Military Correspondence</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Public Relations and Personal Conduct</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Organization of the Army</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Communism</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Nazism</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Fascism, Imperialism and Falange</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>War Department Policies</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Military Intelligence Organization, Policies and Functions</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Inspector General's Department-Organization and Functions</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Judge Advocate General's Department-Organization and Functions</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Organization and Functions of the Military Police</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Organization and Functions of the FBI</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Organization and Functions of the Naval Intelligence</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Organization and Practices of State and Municipal Police</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Practical Work with Headquarter Detective Squads of the Metropolitan Police Forces</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Organization and Functions of the Post Office Inspectors</b>	<b>1</b>

Organization and Functions of the Treasury Investigative Agencies	2
Practical Work with Federal Investigative Agencies	10
Ju Jitsu	8
Examinations	8
Graduation Exercises	<u>2</u>
Total Hours	182

TABLE 4

TENTATIVE PLAN OF ORGANIZATION OF  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENTS

<u>Level</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Division	1	5
Army Corps	2	11
Field Army	6	49
Air Force	5	17
Defense Command	4	28

Source: US Army, The Counter Intelligence Corps School,  
Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War  
II, (Baltimore: Department of the Army, 1959), 5-6.

TABLE 5  
TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION FOR CIC ASSETS IN THE ETO

	<u>Combat Echelon</u> <u>Div-Army Group</u>	<u>Communications Zone</u>	
		<u>Interior</u>	<u>Port</u>
Officers	2	1	2
Enlisted	12	10	16
Total	14	11	18

Source: US Department of War, The Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study Number 13, Organization and Operation of the Counter-Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC, 4 February 1947), 1.

TABLE 6  
CIC DETACHMENT PERSONNEL  
TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND EQUIPMENT 30-500

<u>Unit Personnel by Rank</u>	<u>HQ and Administrative Team Type</u>				<u>Operations Team Type</u>			
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4
LTC	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
MAJ	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
CPT	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	2
1LT	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	2
2LT	=	=	=	=	1	1	1	=
Total Commissioned	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4
MSG (SA)	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1
T/SGT (SA)	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	4
SSG (SA)	-	-	1	2	1	3	4	4
SGT								
Agent	-	-	-	-	2	3	4	2
Clerk	-	1	2	3	-	-	-	-
CPL (Clerk)	1	2	=	=	=	=	=	=
Total Enlisted	1	3	4	6	4	8	11	11
Aggregate Total	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15

Table Notes

1. A detachment composed of a headquarters and administrative team type number A1, plus an operations team type number B1 for tactical ground or air units from 1,000 to 15,000 troops; for any Army installation of a fixed nature exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over 1,000 to 5,000 civilians; or a small geographical territory requiring a small number of counterintelligence personnel.

2. A detachment composed of a headquarters and administrative team, type number A2 plus an operations team, type Number B2 for tactical units, ground or air, from 15,000 to 40,000 troops; an army installation of a fixed nature exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over 5,000 to 25,000 civilians; or a geographical territory more complex than indicated for type No. 1.

3. A detachment composed of a headquarters and administrative team, type number A3 plus an operations team, type number B3 for a large tactical installation such as an

Source: US War Department, Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Washington, DC, 1944), 2.

Army headquarters, or Army Air Forces headquarters; or for complex fixed installations such as base commands, ports of embarkation or debarkation, frontier areas, etc.

4. A detachment composed of a headquarters and administrative team, type number A4, plus an operations team, type number B4, will provide a staff for a headquarters exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over a large geographical area such as a theater of operations over a number of separate military units or installations; over a large civilian population; or where there is an important liaison responsibility with other headquarters or important civilian agencies.

5. Detachments organized under this table are not self-sufficient and will be attached to another unit for administration, mess and supply (except technical supply).

TABLE 7  
CIC DETACHMENT EQUIPMENT  
TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND EQUIPMENT 30-500

Item	<u>Allowances by Type Team</u>								<u>Remarks</u>
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Apparatus, decon, 1 1/2 qt, M2.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh.
Mask, gas, service.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Per indiv.
Respirator, dust, M2.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	When required.
<b>Engineer</b>									
Alidade*, Boxwood. Triangular 8 1/2"	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	When required.
Compass, lensatic.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Do.**
Glass, reading.	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	Do.
Net, camouflage 22'x22'.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh when required
Ruler, folding, 6'.	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	When required.
<b>Medical</b>									
Kit, first aid, mtr veh.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh.
<b>Ordnance Weapons and Miscellaneous</b>									
Bayonet, M1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per rifle.
Binoculars, M3, 6 x 30 or equal.	1	1	2	4	5	10	14	15	When required.
Carbine, cal.30, M1	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per 2 indiv when required.
Gun, sub-machine, cal.45 Thompson.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Pistol, auto, Colt, cal.45, Model 1911 or 1911A1.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	1 per indiv when required.

\*A straightedge having a telescopic sight.

\*\*Older form of ditto, meaning same as above.

Source: US War Department, Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Washington, DC, 1944), 4-7.

Item	Allowances by Type Team								Remarks
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Rifle, cal.30, M-1	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	In lieu of carbine as atzd.
Scabbard, bayonet, M3, Q & M 1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per bayonet Issued.
Watch: Pocket, 15 jewel, or more. Wrist, 7 jewel.	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	Per off.
	1	3	4	6	4	8	11	11	Per EM.
Vehicles									
Automobile, civilian type									As atzd by CG.
Trailer, 1/4 ton, cargo.	1	1	2	3	1	3	4	4	When required. As atzd by theater Cdr/ approp. CG.
Truck, 1/4 Ton, 4X4.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Motor Transport Equipment									
Axe, handled, chop- ping, single bit, stan. grade, 4 lb.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh as required.
Defroster and De- icer, elec., wind- shield.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Rope, tow, 1" dia- meter, 20' long.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Shovel, general purpose, D handled, strap back, rd. pt. No. 2.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Quartermaster									
Axe, entrenching, M-1910, w/hdl.	-	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	As atzd.
Bucket, canvas, folding, 10 qt. or equ.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr. vehicle when required.
Cabinet, file, steel, w/lock, if available, other- wise wood: 4 or 2 drawers high 2 wide, or equal.	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	When required.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Allowances by Type Team</u>								<u>Remarks</u>
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
4 drawers high, 1 drawer wide, letter size or eq.	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	Do.
Can, water, 5 gal.	-	-	-	1	1	2	2	2	Do.
Carrier:									
Axe, entrenching, M-1910.	-	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1 per axe, entrenching.
Cutter, wire, M-1938	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	Per cutter, wire
Pick-mattock, entrenching, M-1910.	1	1	2	4	2	4	5	6	1 per pick- mattock, entrenching.
Shovel, entrench- ing, M-1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per shovel, entrenching.
Case:									
Bag, carrying, ammunition.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per SMG.
Canvas, dispatch	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	1 per off.
Chair, folding, wood, or equal.	1	2	3	5	3	5	7	8	When required.
Cutter, wire, M1938	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	Do.
Desk, field, empty, fiber, company.	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	Do.
Drum, inflammable liquid, gas, steel w/carrying handle or equal.	2	4	6	10	4	10	14	14	2 per mtr veh as required.
File, paper, clip, wood back, 9x12 1/2".	1	2	3	5	3	5	7	8	When required.
Goggles:									
M-1942, complete or equal.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Do.
M-1943, with clear lens.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh driver.
Lantern:									
Electric, portable hand.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	When required.
Gasoline, two man- tle, commercial with pump.	1	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.
Locker, trunk or equal.	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	Do.
Pick-mattock, en- trenching, M-1910 with handle.	1	1	2	4	2	4	5	6	As atzd.
Pocket:									
Double Web, maga- zine, E. M.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Per pistol, cal.45.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Allowances by Type Team</u>								<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>A1</u>	<u>A2</u>	<u>A3</u>	<u>A4</u>	<u>B1</u>	<u>B2</u>	<u>B3</u>	<u>B4</u>	
Web, magazine, for carbine cal.30 M-1.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per carbine,
Safe, field, key lock or equal.	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	As indicated.
Scabbard, gun sub-machine,	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per SMG.
Shovel, entrenching, M-1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	As atzd.
Stove, tent, M1941, c/w grate.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	Per tent issued.
Table, camp, folding, or equal.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	When required.
Tent, command post, black out, c/w pins and poles.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	Do.
Tube, flexible nozzle.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr veh as required.
Typewriter:									
Portable, w/carrying case.	1	1	2	3	2	3	5	5	
Standard, 11" carriage. Underwood or equal, w/box.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	
Whistle, thunderer	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	Per off when required.

#### Signal

Flashlight, TL-122-A	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	As indicated.
Knife, TL-29	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	When required.
Pliers, TL-13	-	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.
Pouch, CS 34 or CS 35.	-	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.

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